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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
THE CHALLENGS OF TRANSNATIONAL PALESTINIAN 
TERRORISM TO THE ERA OF DÉTENTE: 1960-1973 
 
United States Diplomatic historians have understood Henry Kissinger as the 
twentieth century’s grandest statesmen.  His realism and free reign over U.S. foreign 
policy during two presidential administrations was drawn from his life experiences and 
historical understandings of the limits of state power in the postcolonial world.  He is 
understood to be an intellectual who drew his realist worldview from the history of 
nineteenth century concert of Europe and the grand statesmen of the period.  His ability 
to draw lessons from history allowed him to achieve some of the most important foreign 
policy victories of the twentieth century.   His realism recognized the limits of U.S. 
power in the Vietnam era, but he fell back on the nineteenth century model of interstate 
diplomacy as the way forward.  However, his realist worldview drew exactly the wrong 
lessons from history in terms of his ability to address the new problem of Palestinian 
terrorism.  In the postcolonial world, and the Middle East in particular, non-state actors 
such as the PLO and its militant factions became some of the most important elements in 
Cold War era diplomacy.  
The transnational terrorism by Palestinian nationalist organizations in the early-
1970s (beginning in September of 1970 and ending in March 1973) challenged the Nixon 
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administration’s, and most importantly, Henry Kissinger’s pursuit of détente in the 
region, which was based on détente between the U.S. and Soviet Union.  Détente was 
sought for three reasons: in order to maintain the U.S.-Soviet balance of power in the 
region, to restrict Soviet influence on radical Arab governments, and to ensure important 
U.S.-Soviet cooperation in a peace process as outlined in “the Rogers Plan.”  This thesis 
argues that President Nixon and Kissinger’s response to the terrorism proved 
unsuccessful because it was rooted in Kissinger’s realism of interstate diplomacy and the 
limits of state power. Understanding how the administration did not (and could not) 
understand the transnational nature of Palestinian terrorism provides a window into how 
Kissinger’s life experiences and historical knowledge shaped his realist worldview during 
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INTRODUCTION: “America’s Introduction to Global Terrorism”1 
 
The late 1960s and early 1970s was an era of détente—a time when President 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger sought to bring a realist approach to the Cold War, Vietnam, 
and relations with China.  During this era of détente four Palestinian terrorist events 
beginning in the Summer of 1970 and ending in late-spring 1973 revealed a mismatch 
between Henry Kissinger’s “great power” approach borrowed from nineteenth century 
Europe, and the realities of a postcolonial world.  These four events: 1) the Labor Day 
weekend hijackings of four airliners by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP); 2) the ‘Black September’ crisis in Jordan under the leadership of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO); 3) the Munich Massacre in May 1972 by the Black 
September Organization (BSO); 4) the Khartoum Incident in March 1973 by the BSO 
posed challenges to Kissinger’s “great power” approach and the Nixon administration’s 
“realist” foreign policies.   
The challenge these four events placed on Kissinger and the administration was 
that it challenged their pursuit of détente in the Middle East.  These Palestinian 
nationalist organizations used terrorism and guerilla warfare as their means to disrupt the 
Middle East peace process, to articulate their agenda of bringing the voice of the 
Palestinian people to the world’s attention, and to free the Palestinian hostages held by 
                                                
1 “4 Jets Hijacked; One, a 747, Is Blown Up,” New York Times, 7 September 1970, 1. 
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Israel, the U.S. and other states.2  By attacking other nations across many boundaries with 
multi-national forces the Palestinian organizations and their terrorism became 
transnational.  The transnational nature of the organizations and their terrorism 
challenged the realist approach of the administration because it would undermine the 
three reasons the administration pursued détente in the region: 1) in order to maintain the 
U.S.-Soviet balance of power in the region; 2) to restrict Soviet influence on radical Arab 
governments; and 3) to ensure important U.S.-Soviet cooperation in a peace process as 
outlined in the Rogers Plan.  In addition, the transnational nature of these events 
challenged the interstate diplomacy which Kissinger and détente relied on in the region. 
 Before this thesis can address the administration’s struggle to understand the 
transnational nature of the Palestinian terrorism it is important to define the analytical 
lens this thesis will use.  A starting point for our discussion of transnational history we 
will use Thomas Bender’s understanding of transnational as “various types of interactions 
across national boundaries” by various peoples, institutions, goods, and capital.3  Akira 
Iriye argues that transnational history is characterized by a “global interconnectedness” 
that involves nations who interact “cross-national[y]” with other groups, institutions, 
nations, etc.4  Ian Tyrrell, David Thelen, and other historians argue that transnational 
history focuses on the relationships between the nation and “factors beyond the nation.”5  
                                                
2 Mohammed K Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 120; 
for a discussion of "the Rogers Plan" see; Steven L Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making 
America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
3 Thomas Bender, Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002); Thomas Bender, “Wholes and Parts: The Need for Synthesis in American History,” The Journal of 
American History 73, no. 1 (June 1986): 120-136. 
4 Akira Iriye, “The Transnational Turn.,” Diplomatic History 31, no. 3 (June 2007): 375. 
5 For a broader discussion of what is transnational history see; “AHR Conversation: On Transnational 
History.,” American Historical Review 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1440-1464; Ian Tyrrell, “American 
Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,” The American Historical Review 96, no. 4 (October 
1991): 1031-1055; Ian Tyrrell, “Making Nations/Making States: American Historians in the Context of 
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These interconnected relationships can be economic, cultural, social, political, or for the 
purpose of this thesis involve relationships between terrorist organizations without a 
formal state that were supported by other liberation movements and which chose to use 
guerilla warfare and terrorism against foreign and domestic targets. 
 Matthew Connelly’s A Diplomatic Revolution is an example of how transnational 
history can be used as an analytical tool to understand transnational liberation 
movements.  Connelly argues that the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria 
was very successful in internationalizing its fight for independence with the French in 
such a way that it not only involved Algeria and France, but also other nations and 
international institutions.6  The FLN used their fight to gain support from various nations, 
peoples, and institutions across many national boundaries.  The FLN worked remarkably 
well at developing “bureaus” and “delegations” in “Cairo , Damascus, Tunis, Beirut, 
Baghdad, Karachi, Djakarta, and New York” to promote talks and negotiations which 
made possible the maneuvering the FLN hoped for in the United Nations General 
Assembly.7   It is important to point out that while the FLN used the U.N. General 
Assembly during the late-1960s and into the 1970s, the PLO and PFLP did not use the 
body in 1970.  The transnational history and nature of the FLN is important to this 
chapter because it illustrates the FLN’s success in internationalizing its nationalist 
movement outside the borders of Algeria and involved not just the French colonial 
                                                                                                                                            
Empire,” The Journal of American History 86, no. 3 (December 1999): 1015-1044; David Thelen, “Of 
Audiences, Borderlands, and Comparisons: Toward the Internationalization of American History,” The 
Journal of American History 79, no. 2 (September 1992): 432-462; David Thelen, “The Nation and 
Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History,” The Journal of American History 86, no. 3 
(December 1999): 965-975; Michael McGerr, “The Price Of The "New Transnational History".,” American 
Historical Review 96, no. 4 (October 1991): 1056. 
6 Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of 
the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
7 Ibid., 110.  
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government, but the U.S., Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Also, Connelly and others argue, 
Yasser Arafat witnessed the celebration of the FLN in Algiers and later modeled Fatah—
the militant faction of the PLO—on the FLN.8      
Understanding transnational history as the “global interconnectedness” between 
the nation and factors outside the nation and taking into account Connelly’s transnational 
history of the FLN allows this thesis to show how the Palestinian organizations can be 
understood as non-state actors that initiated terrorist attacks across national boundaries 
which focused on domestic or foreign targets.  These attacks triggered relationships 
between the Palestinian organizations, the international system, and the U.S., Soviet 
Union, Israel, and Jordan.9  The use of a transnational perspective allows the argument 
that the transnational Palestinian terrorism of the early-1970s challenged the Nixon 
administration’s, and most importantly, Henry Kissinger’s pursuit of détente in the 
region.  Understanding how the administration did not (and could not) understand the 
transnational nature of Palestinian terrorism provides a window into how Kissinger’s life 
experiences and intellectual pursuits shaped his realism during the era of détente.  
Chapter I of the thesis will provide the biographical and historical background of 
Henry Kissinger.  The primary goal of the chapter is to show how Kissinger’s 
experiences as a Jewish-American immigrant shaped his realist worldview through his 
family’s experiences with violence and intolerance in interwar Europe and his historical 
knowledge of interstate diplomacy and the limits of state power.  The chapter will also 
                                                
8 Ibid., 279-280, see also, Alan Hart, Arafat: A Political Biography.  (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1984),7 and 10; Barry Rubin, Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO.  
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994), 10-104, and 112-113. 
9 For a brief discussion of transnational terrorism in the international system see: Quan Li, “Does 
Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, 
no. 2 (April 2005): 278-297.; and _______, “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 2 (April 2004): 230-258. 
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address how his academic work shaped his realism and opened up doors of opportunity in 
Washington, D.C.  Lastly, the chapter will address how his virtual free reign to shape the 
Nixon administration’s foreign policy apparatus allowed him, through the NSC and the 
secret U.S.-Soviet back channel, to implement his realist foreign policy of détente. 
Chapter II will cover two topics: the transformation of Palestinian nationalism 
from the rise of Zionism in the nineteenth century to 1970s and the four terrorist events of 
the early-1970s.  This chapter will emphasize the change over time of Palestinian 
nationalism from local skirmishes and a reliance on other Arab states to a distinctive 
Palestinian movement based on armed struggle after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.  The 
first section will also address the importance of the organizations’ reliance on other Third 
World liberation movements and the adoption of their rhetoric and tactics to their 
nationalist struggles.  The second part will provide the story of the four events that 
challenged Kissinger’s pursuit of détente.   
The goal of the description of the four events is to provide the day-by-day 
accounts of how the Nixon administration made decisions and how those decisions 
shaped the diplomacy between the U.S., Soviet, Israeli, Jordanian, and Sudanese 
governments.  Also, how the administration’s reliance on the State Department as the 
principle actor in all of the indirect multilateral negotiations proved unsuccessful because 
it did not negotiate directly with the Palestinian organizations.  Most importantly, the 
description will demonstrate how Kissinger’s use of interstate diplomacy—a lesson that 
he drew from nineteenth century Europe—proved how incapable his realist worldview 






CHAPTER I: Henry Kissinger: European Realism in U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order 
on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with 
the two superpowers. ~Henry Kissinger10 
 
The test of a statesman is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to 
make this knowledge serve his ends. ~Henry Kissinger11 
 
Introduction 
 Henry A. Kissinger, according to Jeremi Suri, was like “No twentieth-century 
figure [that] approached foreign policy with a more reasoned, articulate, and informed 
perspective on international relations.”12  He was a Jewish immigrant who benefited from 
his family’s experience with violence and intolerance in Nazi Germany and from the 
opportunities that were available to him after his immigration to America (i.e., military 
service, education, and political service) each of which shaped his personal and 
intellectual worldviews.  These experiences shaped his realist worldview that interstate 
diplomacy, cultural exchanges, military force, and most importantly, that strong leaders 
could shape Cold War era geopolitics. The influence of Kissinger on Cold War era 
diplomacy has been the subject of many articles and books by all kinds of academics and 
journalists.  As the man who produced numerous academic papers, taught the best and 
                                                
10 Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1974), 58; "Essay by Henry Kissinger," 
United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign 
Policy, 1969-1972, Department of State publication (Washington, DC: Dept. of State, 2003), 4[hereafter 
FRUS]. 
11 Quote by Kissinger in A World Restored, citied in; Jussi M Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry 
Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 8. 
12 Jeremi Suri, “Henry Kissinger, the American Dream, and the Jewish Immigrant Experience in the Cold 
War.,” Diplomatic History 32, no. 5 (November 2008): 730. 
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brightest at Harvard, and served as a presidential advisor to Presidents Richard M. Nixon 
and Gerald R. Ford (1968-1977) his legacy is of utmost importance to diplomatic 
historians for understanding how diplomacy was shaped during the 1970s. 
 U.S. diplomatic historians have studied Kissinger’s influence on and 
implementation of the “Nixon Doctrine,” triangular diplomacy, linkage, shuttle 
diplomacy, and détente as he served as the President’s Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (1968-1973) and as Secretary of State (1973-1977) during his tenure.  Each has 
traced the influences of Kissinger’s emigration from Germany, his time in the U.S. Army 
during World War II, his education and teaching at Harvard, and his government service.  
Some historians have also placed an importance on Kissinger’s Jewish identity and his 
experiences with anti-Semitism both in Germany and America as influences on his 
diplomacy.  This chapter seeks to address all of this on a much smaller scale using many 
of the same sources as the historians, but with the added benefit of newly available 
sources from the Office of the Historian’s Foreign Relations of the United States series.  
This is not to say that this chapter is another biography of the twentieth century’s most 
well known diplomat, but a more distilled window into how Kissinger’s life experiences 
shaped his realist worldview.   
The primary goal of this chapter is to outline the history of Kissinger’s life from 
his family’s immigration from Germany in 1938, the beginning of his military career in 
1943, his time as a student and professor at Harvard, and his experiences as an ad-hoc 
advisor to the Kennedy administration, and his appointment as NSC advisor by Nixon in 
1968.  This narrative of Kissinger’s experiences is important on many levels because it 
will address how his early-life in Europe during the collapse of the interwar balance 
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between states shaped his academic work that traced the history of Europe’s state system.  
Kissinger drew general lessons about the limits of state power and interstate diplomacy 
from his experiences in interwar Europe.  After his life and intellectual origins are 
examined the chapter will trace the organization and management of the Nixon foreign 
policy apparatus, the development of the fabled “back channel,” and a conclusion of how 
everything covered shaped the President and Kissinger’s pursuit of détente in the Middle 
East.  By the end of the chapter it will become clear that Kissinger drew the wrong 
lessons from history—the limits of state power and the benefits of interstate diplomacy—
which shaped his realism and pursuit of détente in a region faced with the new menace of 
stateless Palestinian militancy. 
From Heinz to Henry: The Intellectual Evolution of Kissinger’s Realist Worldview 
 Henry Kissinger was born Heinz Alfred Kissinger in 1923 in Fürth, Germany to 
Jewish-Bavarian parents, Paula and Louis Kissinger.  His father, Louis, lost his job as a 
respected school teacher in 1933 when the Nazis outlawed Jewish school teachers.  His 
father would take a job in a Jewish vocational school, but he would lose his job three 
years later.  In 1935, Jewish children were prohibited from attending public schools, so 
Kissinger attended a local Jewish school until the family finally left Fürth in 1938 
because of their fear of extermination.13  The family first arrived in London and stayed 
for two weeks then continued on to New York City.14  Once they arrived in New York’s 
Manhattan Heights neighborhood Kissinger changed his name to from Heinz to Henry 
and enrolled in George Washington High School.  After graduation Kissinger enrolled in 
                                                
13 Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007); Suri, “Henry Kissinger, the American Dream, and the Jewish Immigrant 
Experience in the Cold War.,” 720. 
14 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger a Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 17-32. 
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City College of New York until he enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1943.15  While at Camp 
Claiborne in South Carolina, Kissinger witnessed a lively army private, Fritz Gustav 
Anton Kraemer, give a lecture to the new privates about why the U.S. was a war—this 
experience was the catalyst for a long mentor relationship that would shape Kissinger’s 
army career and future aspects of his life.  Kraemer was a Prussian born immigrant who 
was educated at the London School of Economics, and chose to enlist in the U.S. Army 
and soon found himself working for General Alexander Bolling of the 84th Infantry 
Division at Camp Claiborne.16  Kissinger was so impressed by the arrogance and 
intelligence of Kraemer that we wrote him a letter offering his support. 
Kraemer would become so impressed with Kissinger’s intellect—even though 
Kissinger only completed a year of post-secondary education before enlistment—that he 
removed him from the infantry and placed him as General Bolling’s personal translator.  
Kraemer was also responsible for Kissinger’s other appointments: as an administrator of 
the occupation of captured towns in Germany, a position in the Counter-Intelligence 
Corps, a position as an instructor of majors and generals on military intelligence.17  By 
1947, Kissinger was no longer in the army and was ready to return to the City College of 
New York when Kraemer said, ‘A gentleman does not go to a local New York School,’ 
so Kissinger enrolled in Harvard as a sophomore undergraduate student in 1947.18   
 Kissinger’s arrival at Harvard coincided with a period when the U.S. government 
wanted to promote area studies programs that focused on the education of immigrants 
                                                
15 Robert D. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger Doctor of Diplomacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989), 9. 
16 Jussi M Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 4. 
17 Isaacson, Kissinger a Biography, 39-58. 
18 Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger Doctor of Diplomacy, 10. 
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who were traditionally excluded from public service as “specially qualified personnel.”  
The government saw the increased numbers of Central European immigrants as an 
essential part of the Cold War because of their language abilities and cultural 
understandings.   Kissinger like many other returning G.I.s benefited from the U.S. 
government’s G.I. Bill that encouraged universities, like Harvard, to accept a large 
number of Jewish war veterans because of their skills and the fact that the government 
paid for their tuition.19   
While at Harvard Kissinger lived in the separate Jewish dorms (“Jewish ghetto at 
postwar Harvard”) where he focused on his studies.20  Kissinger met his second mentor 
Professor of Government, William Elliot, who at their first meeting saw Kissinger as 
another “tutee” to supervise.  Elliot made Kissinger read twenty-five books on Immanuel 
Kant and write a paper comparing the critiques of practical reasoning.  Within three 
months, Kissinger had completed the paper which impressed Elliot, who later wrote to 
the Phi Beta Kappa selection committee, “I have not had any students in the past five 
years, even among the summa cum laude group, who have had the depth and 
philosophical insight shown by Mr. Kissinger.”21  Their relationship shaped the rest of 
Kissinger’s undergraduate time at Harvard, as he assisted Elliot in grading papers and 
research. 
 Kissinger’s time at Harvard was spent in passionate academic study where he 
used his political experiences from his military service to develop the notion that to 
combat violence and extremism a state must have strong leaders and avoid 
                                                
19 Suri, “Henry Kissinger, the American Dream, and the Jewish Immigrant Experience in the Cold War.,” 
721-726. 
20 Ibid., 723. 
21 Isaacson, Kissinger a Biography, 62-63. 
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appeasement.22  He completed his massive senior thesis (nearly 400 pages) “The 
Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee, and Kant”—his thesis was so 
massive that the Government Department would later revise the rules regarding the 
length of senior theses.  His thesis was not just on the meaning of history, but also 
personal reflection on life and death, a man’s responsibilities, and the power of 
freedom.23    Although the thesis was full of flaws and quotations from his three main 
characters it earned Kissinger summa cum laude in 1950. 
 After graduation Kissinger considered his options between finding a job, or 
continuing his education when Elliot convinced him to apply to the graduate program in 
the Government Department.  In 1951, under the encouragement of Elliot, Kissinger 
became the executive director of the Harvard International Seminar, which brought the 
best and brightest minds from abroad to the university for the summer.  It was during the 
six week sessions that Kissinger shaped the minds of powerful and important future 
statesmen, and established valuable political contacts for the future.24  During the 
seminar’s seventeen-year history, 1952-1969, he met with hundreds of important 
domestic and foreign individuals who would be shaped by Kissinger’s lectures on history 
and politics.  The most important factor was through Kissinger’s interactions with these 
individuals he was able to develop his notions of the role of the statesmen and the role 
and image of America in the international system.25  Kissinger’s interactions with the 
seminar participants shaped his Cold War cosmopolitanism where he found that he, like 
                                                
22 Suri, “Henry Kissinger, the American Dream, and the Jewish Immigrant Experience in the Cold War.,” 
723. 
23 Stephen Richards Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York,: Norton, 1974), 5-9; Suri, Henry 
Kissinger and the American Century, 29-31. 
24 Isaacson, Kissinger a Biography, 70; Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger Doctor of Diplomacy, 11; Robert 
Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger Partners in Power (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 43-44. 
25 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger Partners in Power, 44-45. 
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other educated immigrants, occupied a place between America and other parts of the 
world where they could become influential in policy making.  He saw himself as the 
figure who could construct “spiritual links” between individuals and their societies by 
affirming the importance of American exceptionalism.  By doing so he could act as the 
“spiritual link” between the young foreign policy minds of the seminar and the U.S.  This 
link and cross-cultural exchange was what Kissinger saw as the correct diplomacy that 
America should purse against violence and extremism.26    
 Because of Kissinger’s experiences with the failure of interstate diplomacy and 
the limits of state power during the interwar period he chose to write his dissertation, “A 
World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822,” on a 
topic which addressed the history of nineteenth century conservative diplomacy.    His 
dissertation focused on the Concert of Europe, a topic that was not typical of the 
department, when students tended to focus on post-WWII international relations.27  The 
dissertation was a contemporary parallel to Napoleon’s challenge to the stability of early-
nineteenth century Europe, in which the conservativism of Metternich and Castlereagh 
restored peace and the balance of power to Europe, through interstate diplomacy and 
realpolitik—politics and diplomacy rather than ideology.28  The realpolitik of Metternich 
and Castlereagh reflected the “realism” of Kissinger himself, the conservative diplomat 
who understood the limits of state power and the fragility of the European balance of 
power.29  Kissinger also saw the moral aspects of contemporary American foreign policy 
                                                
26 Suri, “Henry Kissinger, the American Dream, and the Jewish Immigrant Experience in the Cold War.,” 
724-725; Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century, 124. 
27 Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, 7. 
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as the problem and argued that only through the replication of nineteenth century 
conservative diplomatic processes could a balance of power be established in the 
international system between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
 After the completion of his Ph.D., Kissinger and Elliot expected Harvard to offer 
Kissinger an assistant professor position, but Kissinger’s intellectual views did not match 
with some of the senior faculty.30  Kissinger debated between an academic future, or a 
future in diplomacy when the editor of Foreign Affairs, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, 
offered Kissinger the managing editor position in 1954, but it fell through.  In 1955, 
Kissinger became the discussion leader of the New York Council on Foreign Relations’ 
study group on the implications of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s call for a 
strategy of “massive retaliatory power” against the Soviet Union.  This three year 
appointment led to the publication of his second book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy—his first was his dissertation published in 1957.  The book chided Dulles’s call 
for nuclear weapons as a means to handle the Soviets and insisted that only a direct 
foreign policy could overcome the naiveté of American policy makers.  The book 
contained Kissinger’s realist worldview that massive retaliation was only a short-term 
solution because the threat of nuclear war did not address the dilemmas that a growing 
nuclear arsenal placed on the U.S. government’s validation of that position.  The book 
earned Kissinger massive political and public acclaim as it became a best-seller.31 
 Kissinger’s new celebrity earned him an instructor position at Harvard with the 
chance of a tenure review in two years.  During this period, Foreign Affairs published ten 
pieces by Kissinger on diplomacy, strategy, the organization of American diplomacy, 
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weapons, and European allies.  These successes earned him the patronage of Nelson 
Rockefeller, whom he had met at a conference in 1955.  In 1956, Kissinger was asked to 
head-up a Special Studies Project sponsored by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to edit a 
series of policy proposals that would become the foundation of Nelson Rockefeller’s 
1960 Republican Presidential campaign.32  Richard M. Nixon’s successful bid for the 
Republican nomination over Rockefeller in 1960 and Nixon’s defeat by Kennedy 
effectively removed Kissinger from any chance of a foreign policy position at that time.33 
 While Kissinger served Rockefeller in his bid for the party’s nomination, he also 
served as an ad-hoc advisor on foreign policy for the Democratic Party.  After Kennedy’s 
victory, McGeorge Bundy—Dean of Arts and Sciences at Harvard (1954-1961)—became 
the National Security Advisor and ask Kissinger (one of the “specially qualified”) to 
serve as his personal advisor.34  Kissinger did not work well with Bundy, especially after 
Kissinger complained about the Kennedy administration’s handling of the Berlin Crisis in 
the summer of 1961 and the UAR’s acceptance of arms from the Soviets.  The State 
Department and Bundy saw Kissinger’s complaints and public statements as a burden to 
the department, so Bundy let Kissinger’s advisory role lapse in 1962.35   
Kissinger resumed his intellectual pursuits back at Harvard where he revisited the 
question of massive retaliation in The Necessity of Choice (1961) through his support of 
“flexible response” (the policy advocated by the Kennedy administration) because the 
U.S. had to recognize the drawbacks of the use of massive retaliation and the 
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government’s willingness to use the nuclear arsenal.  Kissinger argued that after the 
Korean War it became evident that the U.S. should respond to a Soviet threat with local 
forces, while at other times the U.S. should send advisors and trainers to help suppress 
domestic threats.  Lastly, the U.S. had to be prepared for the possible use of nuclear 
weapons.36  Ultimately, Kissinger argued that the U.S. should somehow find a way to 
demonstrate leadership in the international system other than the use of a nuclear 
arsenal—a belief that was common beyond the realm of realist thinkers like Kissinger.37  
The strategy of flexible response and the role of the U.S. as a leader was in response to 
the fact that Europe was faced with decolonization, which meant that military 
intervention was no longer viable because of the increased numbers of independent states 
which looked for the support of the West or the Soviet Union.38    
 During the remaining years of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, Kissinger 
did not make his way into the Washington policy circles directly, but sent his advice in 
letters on numerous occasions. Kissinger did not support the administrations’ use of 
economic aid to combat the communist threat.39  He emphasized the importance of 
working within the alliances of Western powers against the Soviets, especially after 
French President Charles de Gaulle removed French military forces from NATO and 
expelled NATO’s headquarters from Paris.40  In a response to this the Council of Foreign 
Relations, with the help of a large grant from the Ford Foundation, developed a study 
group of “Atlantic firsters” to assess the relationships between Washington and the allies.  
Kissinger joined the cadre of realist academics and produced his own volume The 
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Trouble Partnership: a Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (1966).  Kissinger advocated 
for a consensus among the alliance in order to promote a unified front against the Soviets.  
This did not mean that the U.S. should step out of the way and allow the consensus to 
take over, but rather to use the consensus to support the unilateralism of the U.S.41  This 
unilateralism developed into Kissinger’s pursuit of détente during the Nixon 
administration.   
 Kissinger returned to government in 1965 when the Lyndon B. Johnson 
administration began a bombing campaign in Vietnam.  U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge asked Kissinger to go to Vietnam to assess the current situation and determine 
how long it would take the U.S. to “pacify the country.”42  Kissinger visited Vietnam, 
first for two weeks in 1965, July 1966, and October 1966.  After his last visit he told 
Lodge: 
I soon realized that we had involved ourselves in a war which we knew neither 
hopes to win nor, how to conclude.  The enemy’s sanctuaries in Laos and 
Cambodia prevented the achievement of the classic military objective of war—the 
destruction of the military power of the enemy.  In North Vietnam we were 
engaged in a bombing campaign powerful enough to mobilize world opinion 
against us but too halfhearted and gradual to be decisive.  Thus our adversary was 
in a position to control the pace of military operations and the level of causalities, 
both his and ours…I became convinced that in a civil war, military “victories” 
would be meaningless unless they brought about a political reality that could 
survive our ultimate withdrawal…no one could really explain to me how even on 
the most favorable assumption about the war in Vietnam the war was going to 
end.43 
 
Kissinger understood that the U.S. role in Vietnam was going to determine the role of the 
U.S. in the world in the future.  Kissinger undertook secret negations to end the Vietnam 
War during late-summer and early-fall of 1967 with his French counterparts, Raymond 
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Aubrac and Herbert Marcovich.  The negations were code-named “Pennsylvania” and 
ultimately failed as the U.S. proposal was not accepted by the North Vietnamese.44 
 Kissinger remained an advisor to Nelson Rockefeller during 1967 as he pursued 
the Republican nomination. He persuaded Rockefeller to criticize Nixon as a hawk and 
depict Johnson as a bumbling fool.  This plan did not work when on March 31, Johnson 
stunned the nation by his announcement that “I will not seek, nor will I accept the 
nomination” for another term as president. After Rockefeller lost the party’s nomination 
to Nixon, Kissinger performed an excellent balancing act between the Democratic 
nominee Hubert Humphrey and Republican nominee Richard M. Nixon as he served as 
foreign policy advisor to both candidates.45   
On November 25, 1968 Kissinger went to Nixon’s transition headquarters at the 
Pierre Hotel in New York City to discuss the formation of the new administration.  
Nixon, shy as he always was when he met new people, spoke to Kissinger about how he 
wanted to bring the foreign policy decision making into the White House to ensure that 
the State Department and even the CIA could not influence it.  Kissinger shared Nixon’s 
idea and told Nixon that he believed that the administration needed a more formal and 
systematic foreign policy that could identify the basic principles of national interest—an 
essential aspect of realism.  Kissinger left the meeting unsure if he was offered a position 
in the administration, until a Nixon staffer discovered on November 27 that Nixon did not 
formally offer Kissinger the job of national security advisor.  Nixon would eventually ask 
Kissinger to join the administration after the staffer spoke with Nixon privately.  
Kissinger consulted his colleagues at Harvard and Rockefeller who suggested that he 
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accept the position.  Kissinger accepted the position understanding that he would act as a 
middle-man between the White House Chief of Staff, H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, the 
Secretary of State, and Nixon.46  Little did Haldeman, Nixon, and the Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers know that Kissinger’s experience as an academic and advisor in the 
previous administrations would prove that Kissinger knew how to muscle his way in to 
the decision making process.  After his appointment Kissinger, would become a key 
player in Nixon’s agenda of a reformed foreign policy apparatus with the President and 
his close advisors at the helm.      
Henry Kissinger’s Free Reign: The Organization and Management of Foreign Policy 
 President Nixon’s experience in the Eisenhower administration shaped his desires 
and goals to reform how foreign policy decisions would be made during his 
administration.  Nixon felt as though the “bureaucrats” of the Departments of State and 
Defense, and the Foreign Service officers did not give him any credit during his time as 
Vice President.47  The President and Kissinger both agreed that the National Security 
Council—originally established in 1947 by President Harry S. Truman—needed to be 
reestablished and refashioned along the lines of the Eisenhower NSC since it was in 
effect absent during the Johnson administration.  Kissinger told Nixon that he believed 
that there was a need for a more formal decision making process based in the White 
House to ensure that there was a consistent stream of understanding and consensus 
between the NSC, Departments of State and Defense, the intelligence agencies, the Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff, and most importantly the White House.48  The reason behind this reform 
was because of the Johnson administration’s “Tuesday Lunches” where policy decisions 
were made over meals and did not involve any follow-up between staff and 
departments.49 
 The principal factor behind the new decision making process was the 
reestablishment and reform of the NSC as the primary foreign policy forum and the NSC 
advisor who would serve as the chairman and intermediary between the Joint Chiefs, 
State, and Defense.  Kissinger recommended that the NSC structure and procedures under 
the Eisenhower administration be resurrected and reformed to allow the NSC and the 
advisor to meet regularly, prepare the agendas, sum up all the participants’ positions, and 
present them in a formal document to the President after the meeting for approval.  It 
would be the goal of the NSC to recommend and consider “middle and long-term” policy 
issues about current crises and provide planning papers on how to resolve them.  He also 
recommended special policy papers and working groups to handle the current crises (i.e., 
Vietnam, Middle East, Europe, and International Monetary Policy, Strategic Forces, 
Contingency planning, Japan, and AID).50  
 Kissinger’s next plan for the reorganization of the decision making apparatus was 
his plan to create a divide between the State Department, under William P. Rogers, and 
himself.  This can be seen as a manifestation of Kissinger’s personal feelings of being 
surrounded by enemies, or because of the fact that Nixon and Kissinger saw that Rogers 
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was too eager to make decisions.51  Kissinger saw the State Department as incapable of 
taking the lead in the managing of interagency affairs because of their lack of capable 
personnel and their attempts to take charge in Vietnam had failed, evidence of their 
ignorance, at least to Kissinger.  Also if the President wants to listen to all sides of the 
story he must maintain control over all of his people in the decision making process.  
Lastly, the structure of the NSC as proposed by Kissinger allowed for the State 
Department to voice its concerns within interdepartmental review groups.52   
Nixon had already accepted Kissinger’s plan of the NSC as the primary 
determinant of foreign policy when on December 28 he called Rogers and the Secretary 
of Defense Melvin Laird to Key Biscayne, Florida, where Nixon was in the process of 
preparing his inaugural address.     Rogers and Laird voiced their concerns about the 
importance of their own positions in the process, but Nixon told them that he preferred 
Kissinger’s plan.53  Obviously, the State Department’s response to this was that the 
Secretary of State had historically been the principal advisor to the President with regards 
to foreign policy concerns and that the new proposed NSC will not permit a streamlined 
channel to discuss all positions and concerns.54    
On January 9 Laird told Kissinger that he attempted to re-read Kissinger’s plan 
and felt that it would isolate the President from the intelligence mechanisms and funnel 
all information through the NSC advisor and his staff.  Laird also believed that it would 
allow the NSC advisor and the NSC to determine what would be on the policy agenda 
                                                
51 Suri, “Henry Kissinger, the American Dream, and the Jewish Immigrant Experience in the Cold War..” 
52 Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, 7 January 1969, United States, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969-1976, Volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, 3. 
53 Isaacson, Kissinger a Biography, 155. 
54 Paper Prepared by the Under Secretary of State-Designate (Richardson), undated, United States, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign 
Policy, 1969-1972, 4. 
21 
 
without the consultation of other members of the President’s foreign policy team and, 
thereby, permit the advisor to implement policy without the considerations of others.  
Lastly, Laird believed that Kissinger’s plan would completely undermine the President’s 
goal of the revitalization of the NSC because it would not benefit from the combined 
influences of the Departments of State and Defense, the intelligence community, the Joint 
Chiefs, and especially Laird and Rogers themselves.55  This effectively placed a divide 
between Kissinger and Nixon from State, Defense, the intelligence community, and the 
Joint Chiefs.  Kissinger, in a show of sportsman-like conduct, told Nixon that he decided 
to accept the role of the Secretary of State as the President’s primary foreign policy 
advisor and that the NSC will serve as the forum for all policy discussions.56  Kissinger’s 
decision to allow the Secretary of State to remain as the President’s principal advisor was 
a gesture to subdue Rogers’s grievances.    
President Nixon told Kissinger on January 13 that he had respectively rejected all 
of Rogers’s and Laird’s concerns that were voiced to him at Key Biscayne and chose to 
implement Kissinger’s plan.  The memo assured Kissinger that he wanted everyone to 
accept his plan by January 20 and that the President would issue memos that would 
outline the details of the new NSC.57  The NSC’s functions, membership, and duties were 
to follow the model of the NSC that was outlined in the National Security Act of 1947 
with some amendments added by the President and Kissinger.  The primary amendment 
was that the NSC would meet regularly as the principle forum to discuss the primary 
foreign policy issues which involved the President.  The CIA would brief the NSC on the 
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current agenda items and the NSC advisor would use that intelligence to recommend 
agenda items and the necessary papers during his consultation meetings with the 
Secretaries of State and Defense.  The membership of the NSC would include the 
President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Under Secretary of State, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of the CIA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.58   
§ 
It became clear that Nixon and Kissinger’s maneuvers were to rein in control of 
the NSC inside the White House and to create divides between Defense, State, and the 
Joint Chiefs.  Their decision to use the model of the Eisenhower administration’s NSC is 
a clear indication that both saw the NSC and the advisor as an important tool to shape the 
President’s foreign policy without the influence of the established bureaucracy of 
political appointees and Foreign Service officers.  Kissinger’s freedom and ability to 
decide how the NSC would be structured and how his role in the new administration to 
shape foreign policy clearly shows the value of his intellectualism and experience.  With 
the NSC reorganized the President and Kissinger pursued the President’s wish for a 
private and secret channel of dialogue between the White House and the Soviet Union.    
The Back Channel: Kissinger Implements his Realism 
After the Nixon administration took office in January 1969 it was announced that 
the administration saw U.S.-Soviet relations as no longer based on containment and brute 
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military strength, but based on “an era of negotiations.”59  This era of negotiations was 
understood to be important first and foremost because of the Vietnam War occupied over 
a half-million U.S. troops half-way around the world.  The war had divided the country 
with mass demonstrations and marches which caused President Johnson to not seek 
another term as President.60   Congress cut the defense budget and Nixon wanted to end 
the war soon to restore the credibility of the U.S. in the eyes of the allies and the global 
community as a whole.  In addition, the Soviets continued their military build-up in 
Eastern Europe, which culminated in the Red Army’s occupation of Czechoslovakia in 
1968 and the defeat of Arab militaries by the Israelis in 1967 caused the Arab 
governments to shift their diplomatic relations away from the U.S.61  It is during this era 
of domestic and global revolution that the administration wanted to improve U.S.-Soviet 
relations on the global scale through the use of linkage—the policy championed by 
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, which connected political and military issues, 
thereby establishing a relationship making progress in all areas dependent on each other.  
This goal by the administration resulted in a secret and private channel of negotiation in 
early 1971 between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Anatoly R. 
Dobrynin—who was no stranger to Cold War era channel talks since he was involved in 
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private talks with Robert Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.62  The first 
initial talks about the channel originated when the President spoke to Dobrynin in 
February 1969 about his wish to create a line of communication between the White 
House and the Soviet leadership.  This was reiterated a year later to Dobrynin and Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and was accepted the by the Politburo that same 
year.63  The channel had two lines of communication: the first was between the President 
and the Soviet General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 
Leonid I. Brezhnev, which acted as a forum for both leaders to exchange their ideas in 
order to develop a general framework.  The second was between Kissinger and Dobrynin 
in the Map Room of the White House where each thought “out loud” and discussed each 
side’s specific proposals.  The channel resulted in significant agreements: Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty (May 1971), a settlement over Berlin (September 1971), the Moscow 
Summit (May 1972).64   
The origins of the channel have their roots in a February 4, 1969 letter from the 
President to Secretary of State Rogers where Nixon told Rogers, very blatantly, that for 
U.S.-Soviet relations to succeed in negotiations that it was important to establish 
communication from the very beginning of the administration.65  In the afternoon of 
February 13, Rogers met with Dobrynin to discuss the Ambassador’s request for a private 
meeting with the President and that the Soviet government was ready to begin discussion 
on the Middle East. After the President and Kissinger learned of Dobrynin’s request it 
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was agreed that Rogers should not be present at this meeting because both believed that 
Rogers would be too eager to work out solutions.  The White House Chief of Staff, Bob 
Haldeman, was asked to speak to Rogers and tell him that he was not wanted at the 
meeting.66  On the evening of February 14 Kissinger went to a reception at the Soviet 
Embassy in Washington where he met privately, for the first time, with Dobrynin where 
each expressed their government’s wishes to work with each other through a diplomatic 
channel on major issues, including bilateral talks on the Middle East.67    
Both the President and Ambassador agreed to meet on February 17 in the Fish 
Room at the White House (so called because of the nautical theme) and that Kissinger 
and Malcolm Toon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, would take 
Rogers’s place.  During the February 17 meeting, Dobrynin echoed the President’s 
inaugural address that it was time for an “era of negotiations” and that the Soviets were 
willing to work on strategic arms, Vietnam, and the Middle East.68  In a memorandum of 
conversation by Dobrynin after the February 17 meeting he detailed the first private 
meeting he had with Nixon.  In great detail, Dobrynin discussed his boredom with the 
President’s tour of the Oval Office and all of the personal ties to a desk the President used 
as Vice President and a Presidential emblem embroidered by one of his daughters.  He 
continued on to discuss how he made clear to the President the Soviet desire for 
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negotiations on all of the same issues as the President.  Dobrynin also wrote that even 
though he had come to know Rogers, through previous conversations, that he would not 
be the individual to deliver the President’s messages because the President—through 
Kissinger’s advice—felt that he was surrounded by State Department officials.69  
Dobrynin agreed to meet privately and maintain the secret channel with Kissinger, which 
effectively cemented Kissinger’s free reign over U.S.-Soviet relations and allowed him to 
pursue his realist policies on a number of issues.70 
The day after the meeting between the President and Ambassador, Malcolm Toon 
prepared a memo of his interpretations of the meeting and the Soviet and Dobrynin’s 
intentions.  He understood that Dobrynin’s talking points of negotiations were the 
intentions of the rest of the Soviet leadership (Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny).71  
Kissinger also prepared a memo for the President where shared the same sentiments with 
the President that the Soviets appear to not base their decisions on ideology, but on 
national interests and “mutually perceived threats.”  This interpretation by Kissinger is 
important because of the fact that he argued that the Soviets were realists and saw current 
geopolitical decisions through the lens of national interests and mutual threats—a key 
tenant behind détente.  He continued on to say that he saw the opportunity for cooperative 
solutions to mutual international situations and peace that could be reached by bypassing 
détente and using “over Soviet-American cooperation.”  However, he cautioned that the 
Soviets may want to cause tensions in order to achieve their interests and that the U.S. 
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should find a commonsensical way of working with the Soviet interests in areas like the 
Middle East and Vietnam.72  Also, Kissinger suggested that the evaluation of U.S. and 
Soviet interests in different parts of the world need to be analyzed by the NSC in order to 
insure that U.S. national interests and national security concerns would be met.  The 
challenge then became how the administration was going to determine what Soviet 
foreign policy was and how U.S. behavior would influence the Soviet’s decisions.  73   
With the channel in place after February 17, Kissinger and Dobrynin met for the 
first time on February 21.  They had lunch at the Soviet Embassy in Washington where 
Kissinger was asked to make it clear to Dobrynin that the President’s goal for the channel 
was to ensure that all diplomatic discussion were to be funneled away from the 
Department of State because they could not insure that they could maintain 
confidentiality.  The President wished the channel to serve as the primary forum for U.S.-
Soviet discussion with Kissinger as the principle deliverer of the President’s messages.  
The meeting discussed the wishes of both sides to pursue confidential bilateral talks on 
the Middle East, European concerns, Vietnam, and nuclear non-proliferation.  At the 
conclusion of the meeting Kissinger asked Dobrynin to meet with him over lunch in his 
office on March 3 to continue their exchange of ideas.74  The channel between Kissinger 
and Dobrynin was firmly established and would become an essential tool of the President 
and Kissinger in their pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union. 
With the channel formally established, a National Intelligence Estimate was 
prepared on February 27 by the CIA, which provided valuable conclusions to the 
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President and Kissinger about key factors and tendencies in Soviet policy.  It determined 
that ideology (Marxism-Leninism) no longer played the role of “scripture” for the public 
in the Soviet Union, but remained as the “prism” through which those leaders would 
analyze internal and external policy.  Tensions remained after the fall of Khrushchev in 
October 1964 between individual leaders even though “collectivity” was to be part of the 
system.  A decline in economic growth had harmed already strained resources for the 
military and domestic needs.  There was a glimmer of renewed interest in geopolitics 
with regards to the “southern periphery” of the Soviet Union.  European settlement was 
seen as a necessity to form a united front to isolate West Germany.  The Soviets saw the 
importance in the maintenance of competition with the U.S. in Asia.  The leaders no 
longer saw strategic weapons as the key to a balance of power, but rather a “cautious 
optimism” for a decline in tensions in specific areas of the globe.  With the Soviet arms 
sale to Egypt in 1955 they continued to assert influence over the Arab governments in 
hopes of encouraging their movements of national liberation.  They continued to maintain 
a military presence at bases within the United Arab Republic (UAR).  However, the 
Soviets did not see value in joining in the fight against Israel due to the potential threat of 
intervention of other states on behalf of Israel.  They saw the possibility of early 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel a carrot for easing the Arabs towards a 
settlement.  The benefits of a settlement for the Soviets would be the opening of the Suez 
Canal to shorten their shipping routes with Asia and the propaganda that could be used to 
show how the West had to accept the help of the Soviet Union to reach a settlement.75 
The strategic importance of the back channel cannot be underestimated because 
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during the life of the channel (1969-1973) the private meetings catapulted the influence 
and power of Henry Kissinger in Washington from a former Harvard professor and 
occasional presidential adviser to the key individual responsible for shaping the 
administration’s U.S.-Soviet relations during the early-1970s.  In addition this channel 
demonstrated the President and Kissinger’s desire to keep Rogers and his State 
Department out of the foreign policy decision making process.   
Détente and Middle East Foreign Policy 
Even before Kissinger became President Nixon’s national security advisor in 
1968 he held a realist’s worldview of a post-World War II bipolar international 
community made up of the United States in the West and the Soviet Union in the East.  
The globe was not the same size, figuratively speaking, as it had been before the war with 
the mighty British Empire as the single superpower taking the lead in Africa, the Middle 
East, and South Asia.  Rather, the globe was becoming larger as former colonial powers 
disappeared and new states emerged.  America took the place of the British as a global 
superpower.  As the global system evolved after the war America occupied the prestige 
of being the only state to possess the nuclear bomb for a short time and was the sole 
economic power through the Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe and Japan.  During 
the decades which led up to the Nixon administration the Soviets developed their own 
nuclear arsenal and Europe and Japan began to emerge from their economic malaise and 
became economically independent.76   
 Twenty years after the end of the war Kissinger’s realist worldview was no longer 
made up of two superpowers militarily, economically, and politically as existed at the 
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dawn of the Cold War when the US and Soviet Union were the sole competing powers.  
The globe twenty years after the end of the war was confronted by three issues: 1) the 
increased number of states; 2) the number of technological innovations to affect one 
another other had grown; 3) and the aims had changed and expanded.          
During Kissinger’s tenure as Nixon’s national security advisor (1969-1973) the 
“official” decision making involving the administration’s Middle East foreign policies 
was left to the State Department. Even though the official decision making was left to 
Secretary of State Rogers, the President and Kissinger wanted to work around the 
bureaucracy by moving the decision making to the White House through the reforms of 
the NSC.  With a strong NSC, the President and Kissinger were able to create the 
Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) to deal with regional policy decisions 
without Rogers and the State Department.77  With the President’s promise that his 
administration would usher in an era of negotiations, it became the responsibility of 
Kissinger to pursue détente—the de-escalation of tensions—with the Soviet Union 
through negotiations and linkages to other national security concerns to assist in primary 
areas of diplomacy for the administration.  The Middle East would occupy a secondary 
position in the administration after Vietnam, Eastern Europe and nuclear arms treaties.  
Even though the region occupied a secondary position, the administration wanted to work 
with the Soviets, among others (the United Kingdom and France) to negotiate a peace 
between the Arabs and Israelis and understood that the dynamics of Soviet relations with 
Arab countries (especially Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) could jeopardize U.S. interests in the 
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region.78  The administration’s goals for a peace process was colored by the events of the 
Six Day War in June 1967 when the Israeli forces swiftly and very effectively defeated 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and gained the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, 
East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.79        
The official peace process framework during Kissinger’s tenure as national 
security advisor was the State Department’s framework named for the Secretary of State. 
“The Rogers Plan” (as it was known) called for a “comprehensive withdrawal from 
almost all of the occupied territory gained by Israel after the June 1967 war.”80   Rogers 
(in office January 1969 to September 1973) saw the need for a traditional state-oriented 
agreement between Israel and its neighbors, but in Rogers’s opinion Israel was the main 
actor preventing one.  In a December 1969 speech Rogers detailed the plan’s five major 
components which were based in part on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
242 after the June War: 
(1) The continuation of negotiations between Egypt and Israel under the auspices 
of Ambassador Jarring’s UN mission in the region since the June War; 
(2) Israel should withdrawal from territories occupied after the 1967 war; 
(3) Egypt and Israel should live in a “state of peace between the parties;” 
(4) Egypt and Israel should negotiate a demilitarized zone between their borders;  
(5) A solution to the Palestinian refugee concern.81 
These five major components of the plan demonstrated the administration’s “official” 
foreign policy concerns for peace, security, territorial withdrawal, and the Palestinian 
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refugees.  Rogers’s plan wanted first and foremost to reach Arab-Israeli peace and saw 
the involvement of the Soviets as secondary through their involvement of Soviet forces in 
the “Mideast peace keeping forces.”82   
Kissinger wanted to “shield” Israel from any pressure to withdraw from all or 
most of the territory to pre-1967 boundaries.83   Kissinger believed that because of their 
“support for Arab ambitions” any Soviet involvement would jeopardize the peace process 
and the balance of power the administration wanted between the US and Soviets in the 
region.84  He believed that Israel was essential to the process and that the Soviets only 
encouraged the Arab governments’ desire to eradicate the state of Israel.  Moreover, he 
believed that maintaining the balance of power between the US and the Soviets was 
essential to keeping the Arab governments in their places.85   Kissinger understood that 
by giving territory back to Egypt or Syria it would give clout to the Soviets who could 
demonstrate their utility to the Arabs’ cause.86  However, Nixon understood the 
importance of relaxing the tensions between the two superpowers by reaching a détente 
because both were needed for promoting a peace between the Arabs and Israelis.87  Nixon 
also understood the importance of a public framework that could lure Arab governments 
away from the Soviets.88  Kissinger, as a result of his conflicting policy beliefs with 
Rogers and the reluctance of the Arabs, Israelis, Russians, and Nixon to the Rogers plan 
wanted to pursue détente as the means to keep the Soviets on the sidelines of the peace 
process and to keep the Arab governments under U.S. control.          
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The President at the same time understood his own and Kissinger’s concerns 
about the dangers of the plan, and sent Rogers to the region to reach an agreement 
between Egypt and Israel to end the War of Attrition in the fall of 1969.  Rogers’s plan 
ultimately failed as the Soviets, Israelis, and Egypt rejected the plan in late 1969.  His 
regional policies were also damaged when Egypt received surface-to-air missiles (SAM-
3) from the Soviets to counter act Israeli aggression across the Sinai Peninsula in January 
of 1970.  To counteract this the President sent Rogers on a last ditch effort to end the 
conflict between Egypt and Israel and to offer the second Rogers Plan, which called for 
Israel and Egypt to cease all hostilities for three months and to ‘refrain from changing the 
military status quo within zones extending 50 kilometers.’  Rogers’s involvement in the 
decision making of Middle East policy was lost when Egypt exploited a loop hole in the 
hastily drafted plan that allowed Egypt to place missiles on the west side of the Canal. 
Rogers’s stock ultimately plummeted in September 1970 when four hijackings by a 
Palestinian nationalist organization and hostilities between fedayeen forces and the 
Jordanian army in Jordan arose.89    
With the demise of Rogers’s influence in the region and the realization that the 
Soviets were in the “foreground” when it came to making policy decisions in the region, 
the President and Kissinger took over the official decision making process. 90  Once 
Kissinger understood the Soviets place in the region he ultimately sought détente for 
three reasons:  
1) to maintain the US-Soviet balance of power in the region  
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2) to restrict Soviet influence on radical Arab governments 
3) to ensure important US-Soviet cooperation in a peace process as outlined in the 
Rogers Plan.   
Kissinger understood that the Soviet Union was attempting to influence the Arab 
governments to support their presence in the hopes of tipping the balance of power 
toward the Soviets.  He also understood that a Soviet presence was necessary to the peace 
process.91   During the four terrorist attacks of the early-1970s, Kissinger’s pursuit of 
détente with the Soviet Union was challenged by the transnational Palestinian terrorism.92  
Kissinger understood that if he made policy decisions which included direct retaliation 
against the Palestinian organizations that it could push away the Arab governments from 
the U.S. and tip the balance in the region towards the Soviets and possibly jeopardize the 
interstate diplomacy that Kissinger and détente relied on. 
Conclusion 
 The President and Kissinger came to power in the late-1960s in the aftermath of 
the United States’ troubled involvement in the Vietnam War, domestic student protests, 
and “global revolutions.”93  The President and Kissinger wanted to use their realist 
worldview that a balance of power between the U.S. and Soviet Union would help them 
address the geopolitical issues facing both superpowers.  Kissinger, as a result of his 
Jewish immigrant experience and intellectual endeavors, believed that diplomacy could 
be pursued only by a strong state with strong leaders who through humane measures 
would prevent violence and intolerance.  He did not simply place all of his stock in 
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charismatic and enlightened men, like Metternich, but understood that a good statesman, 
like himself, was able to use his cultural and political life experiences to shape foreign 
policy decisions under the guise of American exceptionalism.  In the militarily bipolar 
post-WWII world, Kissinger understood the importance of strategic military force, but 
only as a last resort because of his historical knowledge of nineteenth century interstate 
diplomacy where strong leaders could work with each other in the new world of political 
multi-polarity to achieve U.S. national interests. 
 Through his experiences with violence and intolerance in interwar Europe, where 
the balance between states was collapsing, Kissinger was able to derive general lessons 
about interstate diplomacy and the limits of power in his academic work.  These lessons 
could only have been developed because of his immigration to the U.S. and the lifelong 
mentor relationships he developed in the army and at Harvard where he was able to apply 
his academic work to the U.S. predicament during the Vietnam era.  His involvement in 
the redevelopment of the NSC with the President illustrated not only his belief that his 
“spiritual link” between the language and culture of his Central European childhood was 
beneficial for shaping America’s influence abroad, but the free reign he enjoyed in the 
shaping of the administration’s foreign policy.  The isolation of Rogers from diplomatic 
decision making illustrates both the President and Kissinger’s fears of disrespect and 
ignorance of the bureaucracy and the importance of maintaining a divide between the 
White House, on the one side, and the rest of the foreign policy apparatus.  The important 
back channel between Kissinger and Dobrynin bypassed the State Department’s 
involvement in the President’s U.S.-Soviet policies and created a relationship that would 
involve two exceptional diplomats and allow Kissinger to implement his ideas.  He 
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clearly understood that the Soviets saw the region as their “preserve” and through their 
support of the radical Arab governments the Soviets could tip the balance of power in the 
region further away from the U.S.  It is because of the President and Kissinger’s concern 
that the balance in the region could be tipped towards the Soviets that Kissinger’s Middle 
East policy was an extension of the principles that shaped détente.  But as the next 
chapter will show, they were completely unsuited to dealing with the region’s skeleton in 
the closet: Palestinian statelessness. 
 
 
CHAPTER II: Transnational Palestinian Terrorism: 1970-1973 
 
 
To this people I say: More firmness, more endurance, more defiance, more 
pride…because however profound the darkness, the dawn must come.  I say to them: We 
are with you in the pledge we have given, we are with you in a single trench. ~Yasser 
Arafat94 
 
Since the United States could not stand idly by and watch Israel being driven into the sea, 
the possibility of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation was uncomfortably high.  It was like a 
ghastly game of dominoes, with a nuclear war waiting at the end. ~President Richard M. 
Nixon95 
 
I would only suggest this: The nation that compromises with the terrorists today could 
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Terrorism has been used as a political strategy in the modern era to political 
concessions since the days of the French Revolution’s “reign of terror” when groups of 
individuals revolted against the established ruling class.  In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries individuals continued to revolt by throwing bombs in protest against authority 
and property.  During the early twentieth century these bomb-throwing revolutionaries 
began to call themselves terrorists.97  In the waning months of World War II, U.S. 
intelligence officials were successful in eliminating German efforts in the French and 
Italian liberation movements.98  By the 1940s to the early-1960s terrorism was associated 
with national liberation movements against Western imperialism, especially in Algeria 
and Israel/Palestine.  The association with national liberation movements by the terrorists 
after the 1940s is especially true for the FLN and the Palestinian nationalists who saw the 
successes in Algeria as an invaluable model to adopt.99   It is in the late-1960s that 
terrorism began to take on a new guise from the revolutionary terrorism of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries to one which involved international terrorism.  This 
internationalization of terrorism would develop into a new wave of hijackings and 
kidnappings to obtain political concessions.100  
Beginning in 1961, the United States and the Kennedy administration witnessed 
the first instance of domestic airline hijacking.  Each of the more than twenty hijackings 
                                                
97 Brian Michael Jenkins, "Terrorism and Counterterrorism," in; Alexander DeConde, Richard Dean Burns, 
and Fredrik Logevall, eds., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (New York: Scribner, 
2002), 563. 
98 Timothy J. Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic 
Books, 2005), xii. 
99 DeConde, Burns, and Logevall, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 1:564; Connelly, A 
Diplomatic Revolution, 279-280; Alan Hart, Arafat, a Political Biography, 1st ed. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989), 7 and 10; Barry M Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History of 
the PLO (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
100 Brian Michaels Jenkins, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism,”DeConde, Burns, and Logevall, 
Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 1:564. 
38 
 
between 1961 and 1968 involved the hijacking of domestic flights in the southern half of 
the U.S. and all but one would land in Havana, Cuba.  These hijackings became part of 
the routine U.S.-Cuban relations during this period of the Cold War.  U.S. pilots began to 
carry maps of the Jose Marti Airport in Havana and the Swiss Embassy (the channel used 
by the U.S. to send official messages to Cuba) in Washington, D.C. had paperwork 
prepared for the U.S. to formally request the return of crews, passengers, and aircraft.  
Hijackings were seen more as a nuisance and a financial risk rather than an area of 
presidential concern at this time.  The U.S. was a signatory to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) convention in 1963 that mandated that a country where 
a hijacked plane landed had to return it promptly, but the U.S. Senate did not ratify it 
until after the late-1960s.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) considered the use 
of armed air marshals on high-threat routes as an option to combat the hijackings, but 
pilots and crews fearing gunfights aboard the aircraft overruled the idea. The FAA even 
considered a psychological screening process to identify hijackers and even the possible 
use of the new technology of metal detectors, but the programs would only see voluntary 
testing by a limited number of airlines.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
Justice Department had jurisdiction over hijacking, but did not have a substantial or even, 
an existing force of counter-hijacking personnel.  After the increased hijackings in 1968 
(ten by July 1968) the Lyndon Johnson administration agreed that it was time to adopt the 
ICAO’s convention on hijacking (it would become known as the Tokyo Convention).101 
The first instance of a hijacking which involved the taking of hostages occurred 
on July 23, 1968 when an El Al flight 426 (Israeli’s national airline) was hijacked by 
members of the PFLP in Rome en route to Tel Aviv.  The flight was diverted to Algiers, 
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where the Johnson administration, who realized that hijackings no longer were U.S.-
Cuban issues, worked indirectly through diplomatic channels with Rome, Paris, and 
Cairo to remedy the situation.  Israeli officials called for direct U.S. involvement in the 
situation, but the U.S. chose to maintain indirect multilateral channels to influence the 
officials in Algiers to give up the plane and hostages, or lose commercial aviation traffic.  
The lack of direct intervention in the hijackings and international crisis involving 
terrorism illustrates the Johnson administration’s lack of a defined terminology of 
terrorism and terrorist.  Each would be used interchangeably with guerilla and fedayeen 
in subsequent intelligence and policy briefings.102   
The Johnson administration saw the rise of international terrorism as only a 
“regional phenomena” where a particular insurgent group rises against the political 
regime in parts of Asia and Latin America.  The deaths of U.S. citizens in these 
insurgencies were a product of the Cold War.  The CIA would use counterinsurgency 
measures in Latin America by providing training and resources to the U.S. allies to 
combat the insurgencies.  However, in the Middle East the administration did not see 
terrorism as the result of the Cold War, but rather as a tool of Palestinian national 
liberation movements. Middle East terrorism was understood to be a result of two factors; 
the struggle between radical and moderate Arab regimes, and a result of the Palestinian 
problem.  The U.S. government understood that with the Israeli’s occupation of the West 
Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights after the June 1967 that they needed to maintain a 
moderate Arab regime in the region.  The U.S. supported the Jordanian state under King 
Hussein after 1967 with $45 million in support to combat Arab nationalism and the threat 
of Soviet influence on the radical Arab regimes. The Palestinian problem was 
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exacerbated by the recognition of the PLO as the official voice of the Palestinians in 1964 
and the relations between Fatah (the militant faction of the PLO) and the PFLP with the 
Soviets and other national liberation movements.  Even in light of these two factors, the 
Johnson administration understood Middle East terrorism and the PLO as a regional 
annoyance that caused “headaches” for Israel and the U.S.  President Johnson passed on 
the challenges of hijackings and Middle East terrorism to the Nixon administration as he 
chose to devote his last months in office to the Vietnam War.103 
The Nixon administration came to office in 1969 in the shadow of the 
administration’s foreign policy goals of handling the Vietnam War, the pursuit of détente 
with the Soviets, and nuclear arms treaties.  The Middle East was a secondary concern of 
the administration as it hoped to improve relations with Arab governments after 1967.  
Hijackings and Middle East terrorism became an even lesser issue in the administration 
as the President and Kissinger passed the issue off to the State Department.  In late-
August of 1969, TWA flight 840 from Los Angeles en route to Tel Aviv was hijacked by 
the Che Guevara Commando Unit of the PFLP who diverted it to Damascus.  This TWA 
flight became the first instance where the State Department took the lead in handling 
international hijacking.  Also, this is the first instance in which an aircraft registered in 
the U.S. with an American crew and passengers was hijacked and taken hostage by a 
Palestinian nationalist organization.  The President took a silent position on hijackings at 
this point and allowed the State Department to use indirect multilateral diplomacy to 
negotiate the return of the plane, crew, and passengers.  Kissinger agreed with this 
position and feared potential Israeli retaliation.  The U.S. was successful in earning the 
release of all hostages and the release of Egyptian soldiers held by the Israelis.  This 
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episode showed how the U.S. could use indirect multilateral negations through the Italian 
government to end the crisis with the Syrian government on behalf of the Palestinians 
without direct diplomatic relations with the Syrian government.  It also shows how the 
President and Kissinger’s busy foreign policy agenda at the time placed hijackings and 
Middle East terrorism as a secondary matter to be resolved by the State Department.104   
The Palestinians elevated the importance and impact of Middle East terrorism a 
year after TWA when they simultaneously hijacked four aircraft—an exploit not seen 
again until September 11th—to make their nationalist liberation agenda known to the 
global community.  The first goal of this chapter it to identify the change over time of the 
Palestinian nationalist movement from the rise of Zionism in the nineteenth century to the 
use of transnational terrorism in the late-1960s and 1970s by the Palestinian 
organizations.  Through the analysis of Palestinian nationalism the argument will become 
clear that the decision by the Palestinians to use terrorism was part of their nationalist 
agenda to disrupt the peace process, gain the release of Palestinian prisoners, and to bring 
a voice to their movement.  The second goal of this chapter is to make clear how 
Kissinger’s realist worldview drew exactly the wrong lessons from history in terms of his 
ability to address the new problem of Palestinian terrorism.  Kissinger’s realism 
recognized the limits of U.S. power in the Vietnam era, but he fell back on his historical 
knowledge of nineteenth century interstate diplomacy among states as the way forward.  
In the postcolonial world, and the Middle East in particular, non-state actors such as the 
PLO factions were becoming some of the most important elements in the determination 
of Cold War era diplomacy between the West and the Soviets.   
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Most importantly it is the goal of this chapter to show how the transnational 
Palestinian terrorism of the early-1970s challenged the Nixon administration, and most 
importantly, Kissinger’s pursuit of détente in the region.  Understanding how the 
President and Kissinger did not (or could not) understand the transnational nature of the 
organizations because they were non-state actors provides a window into how Kissinger’s 
intellectual and life experiences shaped his realist Cold War era diplomacy of détente. 
The Transformation of Palestinian Nationalism 
As mentioned in the introduction the form of the nationalism carried out by 
Palestinian organizations, under the auspices of the PLO, in the early 1970s transformed 
into the use of terrorism and guerilla warfare by fedayeen forces.  This transformation to 
the use of terrorism by these guerilla organizations was a major change from the 
nationalism which existed before the Arab defeat in the 1967 Six Day War.  The 
nationalism before 1967 was characterized by local skirmishes and the struggle of Arab 
governments and militaries fighting against Israel on the behalf of the Palestinians who 
were forcibly removed from Palestine—the use of force is contested by the Israelis.  It is 
not until after 1967 that Palestinian nationalism transformed into an armed struggle by 
the PLO and its militant organizations.  The purpose of this section is to outline the 
historical transformation of Palestinian nationalism from the nineteenth century to the 
1970s.  The section will trace the four stages of Palestinian nationalism: 1) pre-Mandate; 
2) British Mandate; 3) the “lost years” of 1948-1967; and 4) post 1967.  It also 
emphasizes the thematic characteristics of the post-1967 Palestinian nationalism as an 
armed people’s national liberation movement against Zionism and imperialism.  The 
section will end with a section on how the leaders of the movement sought to 
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internationalize their movement with their adoption of the ideologies and tactics of other 
Third World national liberation movements during the 1960s.   
The origins of the first stage of Palestinian nationalism is rooted in the rise of 
Zionism in the late nineteenth-century when the Arabs and the Palestinian Arabs105 in 
Palestine were affected by the influx of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe who 
sought to establish themselves in Palestine.106  The Zionist movement was seen as an 
attempt by Europeans to establish themselves over the Muslims in Palestine.107  This anti-
imperialism rhetoric against European Jews will play an essential role later on in 
Palestinian nationalism as it becomes directed first at Britain during their mandate period 
and then at the state of Israel.   
After the outbreak of World War I in 1914, tensions over land purchases and 
migrations continued to rise as Sharif Hussein of Mecca began to write to the British high 
commissioner in Cairo, Henry McMahon to illustrate the Arab requests for independence 
and their opposition to French encroachment after the war.  Sharif Hussein in his 
correspondence to McMahon (July 1915 to January 1916) wanted British support for an 
independent Arab state, while McMahon and Britain wanted to leave room for French 
maneuvers after the war.  After McMahon had “recognized” Arab independence on 
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behalf of Britain, the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916) divided the region into a 
French sphere of influence over Lebanon and Syria and a British sphere over the area 
from the Egyptian border in the Sinai through Iraq to the Persian Gulf.   
On November 2, 1917 in a letter sent by British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour 
to Walter Rothschild (a leader of the British Jewish community) declared that “His 
Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home 
for the Jewish people” this letter became known as the “Balfour Declaration” and became 
part of the mandates established at the San Remo Conference in April 1920 where France 
was given mandates over Lebanon and Syria, the British over Iraq and Palestine. 108  With 
the creation of the French and British mandates in the region the second stage of 
Palestinian nationalism began. 
During the interwar period it became clear that Britain’s and France’s intentions 
to divide up the region into mandates was not in the best interests of all parties involved. 
The May Day riots of 1921 only cemented Arab and Palestinian Arab dislike of the 
Zionists in Palestine as 14 Arabs and 43 Jews were killed.109  Winston Churchill as 
colonial secretary issued a “White Paper” in July 1922 in which he denounced the Arabs’ 
pleas for repudiation of the “Balfour Declaration” and declared that Palestine will 
become ‘as Jewish as England is English’.  Churchill also disputed the Arab claim that 
Palestine was excluded from the areas promised to Sharif Hussein in the letter dated 
October 24, 1915.110  In August 1929 riots broke out at the Western (Wailing) Wall over 
control of the sacred site.111  It is during this time the British government began to 
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understand that Jewish land purchases were the cause of the rise in violence between the 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine.   
The “Passfield White Paper” (October 1930) called for the end of the Jewish land 
purchases, which caused uproar in the British government as significant Zionists resigned 
from their respective posts causing Prime Minister MacDonald to contradict the White 
Paper in February 1931.112  In the shadow of the increased violence and discussion over 
Jewish land purchases a Palestinian revolt broke out in 1936 against the Zionist 
encroachment on Palestinian land and against the British mandate policies.  The revolt 
initially began as an anti-Zionist protest and general strike of Arab and Palestinian Arab 
workers in Jewish owned businesses, but spread to the countryside as a revolt against 
rural landlords.  In response Britain sent 20,000 troops to quell the revolt and in May 
1937 the Peel Commission was appointed to determine the origins of the Arab 
resistance.113   
The Peel Commission reported its findings in July 1937 which found that the 
mandate was no longer viable and recommended that the mandate be partitioned into two 
states.  This meant that the Jewish state was composed of 20 percent of the territory of 
Palestine from Galilee and the Jezreel Plain to the coastal region south from Lebanon to 
Jaffa; the Palestinian state included the remaining territory.  The British government 
retained mandatory control over the territory of Jerusalem and Bethlehem to Jaffa.  The 
Arabs and Palestinians protested the partition because they did not receive the most 
fertile land because it was given to the Jews even though the Arabs gained 80 percent of 
the land.  Zionist reactions were mixed, but in general were satisfied with the partition 
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except for a desire for more land.114  The British government released another White 
Paper in May 1939 in which the British government understood its continued role as a 
mandatory power even though the Peel Commission partition called for two states.  The 
paper declared that Jewish immigration be restricted to 15,000 annually for the next five 
years in order to maintain a one-third ratio of Jews to Arabs in the total population of 
Palestine.  After the five years Jewish immigration would end unless the Arabs allowed it 
to continue.  Land purchases would be placed under regulation in order to ensure that it 
would not harm the Arab farmers.   Lastly, Britain would remain as the mandatory power 
during a transition period towards statehood.115 
During the 1940s the Palestinians were faced with increasing violence and 
pressure by Jewish immigrants and their political and militia organizations.  With the 
Holocaust known to the international community it was urgent that a homeland exist in 
Palestine for Jews fleeing Europe.  Numerous attempts were made to bring fleeing Jews 
to Palestine even though the British government sent them away and upheld the 1939 
White Paper.  Violence began to spread as the Irgun, the militant arm of the Jewish 
Revisionist party, wanted to secure a corridor between Tel Aviv and Jaffa.  On April 9, 
1948 the Irgun killed hundreds of Palestinians when it attacked the Palestinian village of 
Dayr Yassin because of supposed sniper fire on the road.  The massacre at Dayr Yassin 
spread terror throughout the Arab countryside as the Irgun forcibly removed Palestinians 
from their homes.116  Two weeks after Dayr Yassin the village of Jaffa was under a storm 
of mortar fire by the Irgun.  The Irgun later moved house-to-house by blasting holes in 
the walls and by the summer of 1948 750,000 Palestinians had fled Jaffa.   
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The third stage of Palestinian nationalism was ushered in by the establishment of 
the state of Israel on May 14, 1948 by Jewish Labor Party leader David Ben-Gurion.  
This meant that the ultimate tragedy for the Palestinians was the fact that they were no 
longer citizens of the Palestinian mandate under British mandatory power, but were 
refugees in a Jewish state.  After the establishment of Israel the Palestinian people were 
transformed into a Palestinian people who lost their territory, sovereignty and identity.117  
The new state of Israel was to fall within the borders of the UNSCOP (United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine) partition plan of late 1947—Britain officially notified 
the UN on August 1, 1948 that they were going to terminate the mandate.118  Soon after 
Israel was declared, Arab militaries (Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, and Syria) attacked Israel 
sparking the first Arab-Israeli war. During the first stage was from mid-May to June 11 
Israeli forces were successful in stopping the invasions of the Arab militaries.  Between 
June and July 6 a truce was held between the Arabs and Israelis until Syria and Egypt 
grew impatient and sparked the second stage of the war (July 6-July19) when the Israeli 
forces were able to expand into Galilee. By October the Israelis invaded the Negev 
Desert to remove the occupying Egyptian forces.119  Israel significantly expanded its 
territory beyond the borders of the 1947 UN partition to include all but the Golan 
Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank of the Jordan River.  The establishment of 
Israel and the defeat effectively transformed the people known as “Palestinian Arabs” 
before 1948 into a group of people known as Palestinians who were now refugees in a 
Jewish state.       
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 The Palestinians and Arabs in general began to recognize the establishment of 
Israel and Arab defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war as al-Nakba “the catastrophe” because 
700,000 Palestinian refugees were created and hundreds of Palestinian villages were lost.  
This catastrophe meant that the Palestinian people were transformed into a group of 
people who were once the majority in Palestine, but now were the minority.120  Historian 
Rashid Khalidi understands Zionism and al-Nakba as the reasons for the loss of their 
Palestinian national identity and the transformation in their nationalism.  During the thirty 
years of the British mandate the Palestinians struggled against not just Zionism, but the 
imperialism of the British.  It is during Khalidi’s first stage of Palestinian nationalism that 
the Palestinians continually used their press to voice their concerns over lack of 
representation—they previously held a seat in Istanbul before WWI, but were constantly 
ignored when they asked the British government during the mandate.121    The 
Palestinians understood that according to the mandate the British mandatory government 
was to provide the Palestinians with the ability to form their own government alongside a 
Jewish government, but Britain consistently ignored this fact.   
Khalidi’s final stage of Palestinian nationalism existed after 1948 up until the 
creation of the PLO by the Arab League at the Cairo Summit in 1964.  During this second 
stage he labels as the “lost years,” Palestinian nationalism effectively disappeared 
because of the obvious disappearance of Palestine as a territory on the map and the 
relocation of refugees outside their homeland.122  Also, the ideology of pan-Arabism 
championed by Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser during the 1950s to 1960s 
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overshadowed Palestinian nationalism and other Arab nationalist movements at the time.  
With the humiliating defeat of the Arab militaries in the 1967 Six Days War, pan-
Arabism was effectively over as a rallying cry for Arabs and Palestinians who began to 
seek out refuge in the once overshadowed nationalist organizations like the PLO and its 
militant factions like Fatah, which meant that that this was the rebirth of a Palestinian 
national identity and Palestinian nationalism.123  
After the Arab defeat in 1967 the fourth stage of the Palestinian nationalist 
movement was shepherded in and transformed from a movement that relied on local 
skirmishes and on the Arab governments and their militaries into a movement which 
emphasized “armed struggle” by the Palestinian guerilla organizations.124  In the 
“Palestine National Charter” adopted in Cairo (June 1964) it clearly states that the 
Palestinian Arab people who occupied “the boundaries it had during the British Mandate” 
saw “armed struggle [a]s the only way to liberate Palestine”.  The Palestinian nationalist 
movement under the leadership of the PLO (the acting voice of the Palestinian people 
after its creation in 1964)125 transformed the previous movement from an Arab movement 
who represented the Palestinians into a “mass movement” which developed a distinctive 
Palestinian identity of individuals who used armed struggle as their means to liberate 
Palestine from Zionism and imperialism.126  This shift from an Arab movement to an 
armed mass liberation movement is a significant transformation that used guerilla 
warfare, adopted from other Third World liberation movements, and transnational 
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terrorism to disrupt the Middle East peace process, which was a threat to their right of 
self-determination.127     
For an example of this transformation, the section will now focus on Fatah, a 
major militant arm of the PLO to prove that after 1967 Fatah’s identity was Palestinian, 
not Arab, and its ideology was “the liberation of Palestine [as] the way to Arab unity”.128  
Fatah and other militant organizations say their identity was distinctly Palestinian, not 
Arab because these organizations felt as though the Arab governments and their militaries 
let the Palestinian people down through their defeats in all the previous Israeli wars.  This 
feeling of neglect developed into an adoption of the idea that armed struggle, “the logic 
of violence, the calculations of total terror,” from other nationalist movements was the 
only way to make their nationalist agenda known to the international community.129   
The process of making their movement known to the international community 
began in October 1964 when the PLO represented Palestine at the Conference of Non-
Aligned States in Cairo, where the non-aligned states expressed their wishes for the rights 
to Palestinian self-determination and the creation of a Palestinian state.130  More 
important to the argument is that they adopted the ideologies and tactics of other 
movements.  In general all of the organizations looked to the socialist liberation 
movements found in the Third World (e.g., the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, 
Vietnam, and Cuba) and embraced the various forms of a people’s liberation movement 
revolting against imperialism. 
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Fatah under the leadership of Yasser Arafat sought the financial and military 
support of China when Arafat visited the country in 1964.131  In addition to China’s 
support Fatah earned the support of Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea.132    The PLO 
under the leadership of Ahmed Shukayri went to China in 1965 where Mao Zedong 
recommended to Shukayri that “there are many people studying military matters in 
China” and “to go back and take part in fighting.”133  Shukayri learned from Mao that a 
liberation movement can win against imperialism “bit by bit” and by participating in 
other violent skirmishes in the region they would be able to distract their enemies in the 
region.134  More astonishing is that Shukayri pledged in 1966 to send some of the PLO 
guerilla fighters to Vietnam to help support the NLF (Viet Cong).135   
A good example of the adoption of the ideologies and tactics is found in the 
Marxist-Leninist organization the PFLP led by Palestinian Christian George Habash who 
argued that his organization’s liberation movement must be modeled on the liberation 
movements of the socialist Third World.136  In a speech to Arab students Habash argued 
that the success of the Vietnamese liberation movement was that the way a group of 
“people that wages a just people’s war through revolutionary organization, a popular 
front and the mobilization of the masses, through combat proficiency, support by its 
alliances at international level, can achieve victory and rub the nose of imperialism in the 
dust.”  The duty of the “masses” is to declare:  
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that the Zionist, imperialist, reactionary enemy, for all his might, for all his war 
machine, for all his Phantoms, for all his technological superiority—we must 
declare to him that he can strike as many blows at us as he likes…but he cannot 
destroy our will to fight, and it is impossible that he should ever be able to do 
so.137 
 
The liberation movement must “prove to the world that there is a problem of a people that 
can never, under any circumstances, surrender, in spite of all the conspiracies that have 
been concocted against its destiny for fifty years.”138  He also associated the fedayeen 
forces in the Palestinian movement with the “fifth columns” found in other liberation 
movements in China, Vietnam, and Cuba.139  Habash called on the masses to support the 
liberation movement’s efforts to form alliances with liberation movements in the Third 
World and especially with the Soviets and Chinese.140  Habash visited China and North 
Korea in November of 1970 to arrange for joint operations with the Japanese Red Army 
terrorist group and to secure arms during his armed conflict with the Hashemite regime in 
Jordan.141  Habash’s notion that liberation movements must prove themselves to the 
world is essential to understanding how they desired and needed to internationalize their 
movement. 
§ 
Tracing the four stages of the Palestinian nationalist movement is important for 
understanding how and why the organizations internationalized their movement with 
their adoption of the ideologies and tactics of liberation movements in the Third World an 
how those methods were used against Western imperialism.  This section allows for a 
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clearer picture of why the movement made a change from local skirmishes and a reliance 
on other Arab governments to resist Zionist imperialism to guerilla warfare and terrorism.  
The feeling of being let down by the Arab governments after 1967 and the end of pan-
Arabism allowed Ahmed Shukayri, Yasser Arafat, and especially George Habash to 
follow the movements of China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba.  Through the leaders’ 
visits to these countries and the training some of their fedayeen received the 
organizations effectively internationalized their movements.  The relationships forged 
between the Palestinians and the other liberation movements allowed them to gain 
knowledge, training, and financial and military support from these countries.  More 
importantly they were able to bring their nationalist agenda to the international 
community through their use of transnational terrorism.   
It is important for this section to make clear that the efforts of the Palestinian 
leaders to internationalize their movements made them transnational because of the 
relationships the leaders made with the leaders of other liberation movements because it 
established a transnational network of connections between organizations which wanted 
to liberate themselves from Western imperialism.  This network of relationships is 
important because these Palestinian organizations were non-state actors who had no 
choice but to rely on the relationships with other states in order to train, equip, and 
provide legitimacy to their nationalist struggle against imperialism and Israel.  
Understanding the shift after 1967 to the use of terrorism and guerilla tactics makes clear 
how Kissinger’s realist Middle East foreign policy of détente was incapable in dealing 
with the fact that the Palestinian organizations were stateless and used irrational violent 
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measures to gain political concessions in an international system that relied on interstate 
diplomacy and indirect multilateral negotiations to end the crises. 
The Labor Day Hijackings 
Journalist Marvin Kalb later recalled the events of September 6, 1970 as 
“America's introduction to global terrorism” when four airliners bound for New York 
from Europe were hijacked by terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP).142  Three of the flights were diverted to Jordan and the fourth landed in 
London after an in flight gunfight killed one of the hijackers.143  Kissinger, in his memoir 
White House Years, identified these Labor Day hijackings as a national security crisis 
where U.S. faced “two problems, the safety of the hostages and the future of Jordan,” 
which was virtually occupied by the PLO during the period and was threatening the 
safety and stability of the Jordanian government under King Hussein ibn Talal.144  At one 
point the administration determined that the stability and security of King Hussein was 
more important to U.S. national security than the safety of American hostages.145  The 
stability of Jordan was important to the administration because Jordan was allied closer to 
the US than the Soviet Union.  Since the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day war King 
Hussein had placed his “feelers” out looking for peace between the Arabs and the 
Israelis.146   
The President was at his western retreat in San Clemente, CA when the hijackings 
occurred.  He released a statement through his press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, and chose 
to remain “indivisible” on the issue as he did with the TWA hijackings in 1969.  
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Kissinger agreed with the President’s decision to remain indivisible on the issue and 
understood that more important than the hostages was the maintenance of a Western bloc 
in the negotiations as he feared that the Swiss, Germans, or British would give into the 
PFLP’s requests and release the prisoners to save their own nationals.  Kissinger’s 
concern was based on the administration’s experiences in Damascus with TWA 840 
when the other Western nations released the prisoners before the Americans and Israelis 
aboard could be negotiated for.147   
Kissinger recounted that the U.S. and Israeli policy of not giving into blackmail 
by guerillas gave the Israelis the leverage to hold guerillas in Israel; nevertheless 
Kissinger advised the National Security team to urged negotiations.148  The 
administration understood the negotiation as a potential avenue after the eventual success 
of their negotiations in Damascus in 1969.149  In a memo to President Nixon, the Deputy 
Assistant for National Security General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. wrote that the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was willing to negotiate with the 
hijackers for the release of the fedayeen prisoners being held by Switzerland, Federal 
Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom.150  As National Security Advisor, 
Kissinger told President Nixon on September 8 that the U.S. government was working 
with the Embassy in Amman, Jordan to insure that the ICRC was able to negotiate with 
the PFLP.  Furthermore, in the memo Kissinger noted that Secretary of Transportation, 
John A. Volpe, since February 27 had been investigating possible “sophisticated 
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surveillance equipment which might be used to detect explosives and other materials 
which could be used by airplane saboteurs;” an indication that concerns over the 
hijacking of airliners was developing into a national security concern.151  However, 
Kissinger, Rogers, and Laird made no comments about the possibility of expanding the 
presence of federal surveillance at the airports.152  
The next day, a memo to the President proposed placing armed guards on 
American domestic and international flights.153  Even though the President took a quite 
public stance on the hijackings he wanted faster improvement of security on aircraft and 
wanted armed guards on all U.S. aircraft—this was because the President was impressed 
by the El Al security on the flight that safely ended the hijacking without harming any of 
the passengers.  The President felt that his advisors were not working hard enough to 
resolve the issue of air security.  On September 9 law enforcement and airline officials 
came to the White House to discuss the issue and, the administration located 125 sky 
marshals (100 from Treasury Department and FAA, and 25 from the CIA).  These 
numbers were too low for the President and he understood the fact that it would take time 
to train the remaining 3,000 civilian personnel, so he wanted to use the armed forces.  
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird was opposed to the idea of the involvement of U.S. 
military personnel and the federal government in air security.  Laird wanted to revise the 
President’s statement about the armed guards to state that it should involve local law 
enforcement and that the President should not even be involved in the issue of 
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hijacking—just as in the case of TWA flight 840.154  The President also raised the 
possibility of an embargo against states the protected the hijackers; Rogers and Kissinger 
united against the issue (a very rare occurrence) because it would harm the peace process 
and the fact that the U.S. had little to trade with Syria, Algeria, and other Arab 
countries.155  
While the administration debated about how to deter future hijackings, the 
Washington Special Action Group (WSAG)—the administration’s crisis management 
group—met to hold a discussion about the involvement of military forces to earn the 
release of the hostages.  The group met (without the President) to discuss contingency 
plans which involved three different scenarios: “extricating” the hostages, the evacuation 
of all American citizens from Jordan, or the possibility of intervention on behalf of King 
Hussein should the PLO gain the upper hand in Amman.  This discussion is an indication 
that the administration and Kissinger struggled to determine whether the safety of the 
hostages or the stability of Jordan was a greater national security concern.  Before the 
WSAG meeting, Kissinger ordered six C-130 aircraft to be moved and on stand-by in 
Incirlik, Turkey and the USS Independence to move into position just southeast of Crete 
near the Lebanese coast.     
The Pentagon advised WSAG that the U.S. military did not have the means to 
extricate the hostages from the terrorist-held airfield even though a brigade from Europe 
would be ready within forty-eight hours if necessary.  With this news the NSC advised 
against military intervention because it could elevate the crisis.  Kissinger also warned 
against the encouragement of the Israelis in the freeing of the hostages for the fear that it 
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may spark another war in the region.156  By making hijacking a security concern the 
administration was beginning to understand that the terrorism perpetrated by the PFLP 
was transnational in that it was aimed at foreigners, especially American and Israeli 
citizens.  Kissinger also understood the complexity of the situation at this time as he and 
the President struggled to free the hostages in occupied Jordan while they juggled the task 
of maintaining King Hussein and keeping the Israelis from creating the next Middle East 
war.  Also on September 9, the United Nations Security Council resolution 286 noted 
concerns for the people aboard the hijacked planes, urged that they should be released, 
and recommended that states should take the legal actions necessary to prevent future 
hijackings.157   
In a statement by the President on September 11, 1970—against the wishes of 
Laird and Kissinger—he outlined his seven point program to deal with “the menace of air 
piracy.”158  The proposed program consisted of:  
1) Placing Government trained armed guards on American airliners  
2) Ordering the Department of Transportation to ensure that an increase in the use 
of electronic surveillance performed by American carriers 
3) That an inter-departmental research program be established to develop new 
technologies to search for weapons and explosives  
4) Directing the State Department to work with other governments to combat 
hijackings 5) calling for an international conference to be held at the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)  
6) Stating that it was the policy of US government to hold states responsible for 
allowing the hijackers to pursue blackmail within their borders  
7) To work with the United Kingdom to bring the issue before the Security 
Council.159  
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This seven point program is an indication that the administration was concerned by the 
treat of this new transnational terrorism and the effects it could have not just on domestic 
US airliners, but also international aviation.  By calling for an international conference, 
the administration was working within the traditional international system of gathering 
states at international organizations (like the UN and ICAO ) to solve international crises, 
but these hijackings were different because they involved non-state actors engaged in 
international terrorism against many individuals, as opposed to states acting against other 
states.  
On September 12, the PFLP blew up the three planes in the Jordanian desert after 
all of the hostages were released and escorted to Amman.160  A memo was prepared in 
the State Department on September 12 outlining the international efforts to combat 
hijacking emphasizing that the Tokyo Convention (1963) provided for the immediate 
return of aircraft, passengers, and crew.  The memo also noted the need for future 
meetings to be held on the convention.161  A telegram sent by the State Department to the 
embassies outlined Secretary Volpe’s statements to be delivered at the ICAO.  It also 
detailed that Nixon had made the decision to use government trained armed guards, to 
increase the use of electronic surveillance equipment, and that he had directed to 
Secretary of State William P. Rogers to speak with other governments about how to 
prevent hijacking.162 
The U.S. proposal to the ICAO included a section that called on the ICAO to 
suspend air services in nations which allow for “international blackmail” by detaining 
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aircraft, passengers, and crew and failing to extradite or prosecute the hijackers.163 These 
sanctions indicate that the administration was incapable of determining a way to directly 
punish the PFLP because they were not formal state actors who could be punished by 
other states or international organizations.  By punishing the states who allowed the 
“international blackmail” to occur the administration was drawing on its foreign policy 
experiences of using states to combat national security concerns.    
Following the ICAO’s adoption of the U.S. proposal on October 6, Kissinger and 
his staff prepared a list of possible U.S. sanctions to be imposed on nations which were 
uncooperative on the issue of hijacking, including: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, UAR (Egypt 
continued to use “UAR” as their official name until 1971), Algeria, North Korea, and 
Cuba.  Of importance to the administration’s foreign policies in the region were Jordan 
(who was the closest Arab ally to working for peace) and Syria and the UAR because of 
their close ties to the Soviets.  Kissinger’s memo detailed the “appropriate sanctions” 
including: economic sanctions, cessation of the use of specific airports by U.S. airliners, 
following the ICAO sanctions, and cutting-off loans from the Export-Import Bank.164   
These sanctions represented the complexity of the situation because they were 
controversial with regards to the fact that they would be against Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, 
and the UAR.  If they were applied to Jordan the likelihood that the Jordanian state could 
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survive was minimal because the sanctions would jeopardize the stability of King 
Hussein who was faced with the conflict between his own military and the fedayeen 
forces in his country.  The second problem the sanctions represented was that if they were 
targeted at Syria, Lebanon, and the UAR it was very likely to alienate those governments 
to seek additional support from the Soviets.    If these Arab governments sought Soviet 
assistance, the U.S. hopes of a peace negotiation and the balance of power in the region 
might tip towards the Soviets.  Directing these possible sanctions aimed at these states 
and not the PFLP indicated that the administration did not know how to focus their 
policies on the organization itself.   
Kissinger, on the same day, issued a request to the Chairman of the Under 
Secretaries Committee John N. Irwin, to develop a list of states uncooperative on 
hijacking, possible sanctions against them, and to have it ready by November 13.  
Kissinger based the request on the fact that Nixon had requested on September 11 that the 
U.S. should hold states where hijacked planes land “responsible.”165  A detailed report 
following Kissinger’s request was prepared in a memo to the President on December 13, 
which outlined in three sections the states that had been uncooperative, possible 
multilateral sanctions against them, and specific examples of their uncooperativeness.166   
In light of the recent hijackings, the United States pressured the ICAO to draft a 
convention similar to the Tokyo Convention, but to specifically focus on hijacking and 
the legal grounds for punishment.  In a letter the President thanked Walter Binaghi, the 
President of the Council at the ICAO for the Council’s concern over the hijackings and 
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informed him that he had instructed the U.S. representatives to provide a draft 
resolution.167  The seriousness of the situation was evident by the fact that the 
“Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft” was drafted on 
December 16, 1970 and entered into force on October 14, 1971.168  The convention, 
signed at The Hague, made it clear that it considered: 
That unlawful acts of seizure or exercise of control of aircraft in flight [could] 
jeopardize the safety of persons and property, seriously affect[ing] the operation 
of air services, and undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world in the 
safety of civil aviation. 
 
Clearly, hijacking had become a national security concern in the U.S. and abroad.  Article 
4 and Article 7 are the most important articles of the convention that address the means 
by which the state determines its “jurisdiction over the offense” and over extradition of 
the offender.169  On March 24, 1971 the Executive Secretary of the Department of State, 
Theodore Eliot, Jr., sent a memo to Kissinger that asked the President to sign off on the 
Executive branch’s approval of the Hague convention so it could be sent to the Senate to 
be ratified.170  The convention was ratified by the Senate on September 14.171   
§ 
 Just as previous administrations had Nixon’s used indirect multilateral 
negotiations to resolve hijackings.  The President and Kissinger maintained that the State 
Department was going to take the lead in the negotiations, but only through the use of the 
                                                
167 United States, United States, and United States, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 
Richard M. Nixon, 1971 (Washington: Federal Register Division, National Archive sand Records Service, 
General Services Administration, 1972), 345. 
168 James LaryTaulbee, Law Among Nations, An Introduction to Public International Law 8th edition 
(Pearson/Longman,2006 8th edition, 2006), 381. 
169 Telegram from the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State, 16 December, 1970, United 
States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-
1972, 1:83. 
170 Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, “Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
Recommended for Submission to the Senate,” 24 March 1971, Ibid., 1:84. 
171 “Hague.pdf,” http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/Hague.pdf, (accessed 6 November 2008). 
63 
 
ICRC and the ICAO.  The maneuvering by administration’s officials in response to news 
of the hijackings demonstrated that the hijackings on September 6 triggered a momentary 
national security crisis.  Various members from all levels and departments of the Nixon 
administration met to determine what to do in the immediate future, with respect to the 
security of civil aviation, but more importantly how to use the international system to 
deal with transnational Palestinian terrorism.  It is clear that the President and Kissinger 
wanted to use multilateral negotiations to combat the hijackings because the framework 
allowed for the administration to draft a proposal to punish the states that were 
uncooperative.  Even though the ICAO and the sanctions developed by Kissinger were a 
form of punishment towards the PFLP for the hijackings they were only capable of 
punishing the states that were uncooperative because the PFLP was stateless.  President 
Nixon’s statement on September 11 shows that he viewed hijacking as a “menace” that 
must be dealt with and that armed guards and electronic surveillance were a priority for 
the government to combat the new transnational terrorism.  However, the solution was 
only a domestic solution and did not have the unrelenting support of Kissinger and his 
NSC, or even the Secretary of Defense.  Most importantly and most shockingly, the 
President and Kissinger’s consideration that the stability of King Hussein was a greater 
national security issue than the safety of the hostages demonstrated the realism of 
Kissinger’s principal foreign policy goal of maintaining a balance of power in the region. 
Black September 
 During the September 6 hijackings of four airliners a crisis emerged in the foreign 
policy center of the administration as King Hussein’s Jordan erupted into a violent crisis 
between his army and the Palestinian guerilla organization located within the country.  
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Since the 1967 Six Day war hundreds of thousands of Palestinians had fled to Jordan. 
One of these Palestinians, Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, effectively set up 
“Palestinian state within Hussein’s Jordanian Bedouin state.” 172  From the Arafat’s 
headquarters in the town of Karameh the PLO had carried out guerilla attacks against 
Israel in the West Bank since 1967 and allowed for small violent skirmishes between the 
PLO and Israel in Jordan contradicting Hussein’s minute attempts for peace with Israel.  
By hijacking planes and holding Europeans, Israelis, and Americans George Habash’s 
PFLP successfully blew flames onto an already simmering fire within Jordan. 
 In the wake of the hijackings, according to a paper prepared by the State 
Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Amman was in a “near-anarchical 
condition” as shootings, theft, random searches by fedayeen forces (Palestinians and 
members of the PLO) at makeshift roadblocks, and skirmishes between the “Palestinian 
commandos” (fedayeen) and the Jordanian army happened on the streets.173  In response 
to this crisis the U.S. administration formed three objectives:  
1) to maintain King Hussein’s power during the  crisis  
2) to save the hostages 
3) to prevent the British, Germans, and Swiss from making separate deals with the 
Palestinian terrorists 
 
WSAG met to work out a strategy using the three objectives.  Under the leadership of 
Kissinger the group met each day of the seventeen day crisis with the Secretary of Near 
Eastern Affairs, the deputy Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretary of State, the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the head of the CIA.  The intentional exclusion 
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of Laird and Rogers effectively moved the deliberation from those departments to the 
NSC in the White House—a primary goal of the President and Kissinger since the 
beginning of the administration.174  As a result of the WSAG meetings the administration 
increased the presence of U.S. armed forces in the area and moved the Sixth Fleet to the 
eastern Mediterranean.175  In the first few days of the crisis, the WSAG recommended 
that King Hussein use his army against the fedayeen, but Hussein was reluctant.176  
In a report from Secretary Rogers to embassies in the region, he pointed out that 
the Soviets could side with the Arabs on the issue of Jordan and that the U.S. should take 
into consideration Iraq’s (and later Syria’s) potential support of the fedayeen.177  Building 
on this concern of Soviet support of Arab governments and Iraq’s possible attack on 
Jordan, the WSAG discussed possible U.S. air involvement if Hussein asked for it, or 
whether the Israelis should provide it.  The consensus was that either option would 
jeopardize U.S.-Soviet relations in the region as it was most certain that if the U.S. or 
Israel got involved the Soviets would support Iraq and ultimately end the peace process 
for a time.178  The three remaining planes from the Labor Day hijackings were blown up 
in the Jordanian desert on September 12, and a tentative and delicate cease fire remained 
between the fedayeen and the Jordanian army.179 
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 By the night of September 15 Kissinger and the administration learned that King 
Hussein had chosen to face-off against the fedayeen.  He learned that Hussein established 
a military government the following morning to be posted around the city and await any 
offensive by the fedayeen.180  King Hussein struggled with this decision to use his own 
forces to face-off against the fedayeen because he feared that his army may split along 
Jordanian and Palestinian sides and that he feared that his military could have to rely on 
U.S. or Israeli forces to bail them out.181  Kissinger expressed his concerns about 
Hussein’s intervention against the fedayeen to Nixon and cautioned that it could fail, 
destabilize U.S.-Soviet relations by requiring either’s involvement, and possibly involve 
the Israelis.182  In the early morning hours of the September 17, Hussein ordered his 
troops to attack and because of fears of Syrian intervention the U.S. positioned its armed 
forces in Cyprus, Crete, and Turkey to support Jordan.183  This positioning of U.S. armed 
forces in the Mediterranean clearly shows the administration’s concern that Syria and 
Iraq, with the support of the Soviet Union, might become involved in the crisis and 
potentially cause the collapse of Jordan.  By stationing its armed forces in the area, the 
administration demonstrated that it understood that it might be able to prevent the loss of 
Jordan, but would only intervene directly if absolutely necessary because of the fear of 
further Soviet involvement that may tip more Arab governments to enter the conflict.   
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 On September 19, Kissinger learned that the Israelis had spotted Syrian tanks 
moving towards the Jordanian border.  The administration witnessed Soviet advisors 
jump off of the Syrian tanks as the rolled into northern Jordan.184  The Jordanians had 
been under the fire of the Syrian tanks near Dar’a. The Iraqis remained out of the 
fighting, although Iraq had two units in Jordan at that time.  Because of this Israeli 
intelligence the administration learned that the Soviets were concerned about U.S. or 
Israel intervention, but there was no indication early on September 19 that the U.S. 
acknowledged the Soviet concern.185  In a memo from Helmut Sonnenfeldt (a member of 
the NSC team) to Kissinger advised that the Soviets were concerned about how “outside” 
intervention might amplify the current hostilities and “force them into the unpalatable 
decision of going to the defense of the Arab states with their own personnel.”   
Sonnefedlt also warned that the Soviets wanted to make clear to the U.S. that the “Middle 
East is a Soviet preserve where the U.S. can no longer act with impunity.” The memo 
concluded that the Soviets did not want any outside intervention (U.S. or Israeli) even if 
it solved the crisis in the region, but “would probably prefer to see the King remain in 
power.”186  Sonnefeldt’s advice to Kissinger regarding the Soviet threat of military 
support on behalf of the Arab governments and that the region was a “Soviet preserve” 
proves that the administration’s and Kissinger’s concerns of direct Soviet intervention in 
the crisis was rooted in fact, but also the delegacy of maintaining a balance of power in a 
region was of interest to both superpowers.  The U.S. publicly condemned Syria for its 
involvement and developed a military supply package to be used by the Jordanian 
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government if needed.  The U.S. offered to make sure that the Sixth Fleet was available 
to aid if requested and that an airlift of military and hospital supplies from Turkey was on 
alert.187    
 In an NSC meeting during the morning of September 21 the council discussed the 
possibility of Israeli involvement in Jordan.  They understood that while Israel had no 
territorial aims, it did see the elimination of the PLO from Jordan as a plus.  They also 
understood that Israel wanted U.S. support against any possible Soviet retaliation on 
behalf of the Arab governments.  All parties involved—the U.S., Israel, and Jordan—
agreed to the use of Israeli forces and wanted to make clear whether or not Hussein was 
willing to use them.188  King Hussein understood the potential value of Israeli airstrikes, 
but did not see the value of Israeli ground forces because he grew suspicious of Israeli 
intentions after 1967.189  The Jordanian town of Irbid fell to the Syrians by the morning 
of September 21 and as a result Hussein authorized the potential use of Israeli airstrikes 
to combat Syrian forces already present and to prevent the movement of future Iraqi 
forces.190  By the morning of September 23 no Israeli forces were used and a new cease-
fire was reached between the Jordanian army and the fedayeen.191  A conference was 
convened on September 22 in Cairo by Arab governments concerned about the Jordan 
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crisis.  They appointed Sudanese President Jaafar Muhammad al-Nimeiry as the mediator 
between Arafat and Hussein.192   
During a phone conversation between Dobrynin and Kissinger on the evening of 
September 24 the two discussed the invasion of Jordan by Syrian forces (September 19) 
about the knowledge of the invasion by the Soviets.  Dobrynin assured Kissinger that the 
Soviets had no prior knowledge of the Syrian intent to invade and that Soviet advisors 
dropped off tanks to the Syrians before the invasion.  Kissinger understood this to be a 
contradictory statement in his memo of the conversation the following day since Israeli 
intelligence notified the administration of the invasion and that the administration 
witnessed Soviet advisors dismount the tanks on the day of the invasion.193  In 
Dobrynin’s memo of the conversation, he detailed Kissinger’s questions of Soviet 
involvement in Jordan, but did not make any specific reference to Kissinger’s concerns 
over Soviet involvement in the Syrian invasion.  Dobrynin focused more on the concerns 
of the Soviet government that the U.S. should increase its restraining influence on Israel 
and King Hussein in the hopes of a peace settlement—this position is not mentioned by 
Kissinger in his memo.  Dobrynin also reported that the U.S. has no interests in U.S. 
direct military involvement in the crisis in Jordan, but only that preparations were for 
security purposes.194           
By the morning of September 26 the cease-fire remained intact and Nimeiryi 
returned to Cairo with Arafat to speak with Egyptian President Gamael Abdel Nasser.  
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All parties opposed Hussein and felt that the PLO was under attack by the U.S. and 
Israel.195  September 27 saw the signing of a cease-fire agreement between Arafat and 
Hussein at the Cairo Hilton.  By 19:25 GMT the fedayeen and Jordanian forces were to 
cease all military actions.  Arafat and Hussein agreed to withdraw all fedayeen and 
Jordanian forces from Amman, restore law and order as it was prior to the crisis, and end 
the military government.196  Unfortunately violence remained between the fedayeen and 
the Jordanian army until June 1971 when the Jordanian army crushed the PLO, which 
fled to Lebanon.  
§ 
What the Labor Day hijackings and Black September represent is a period in 
which the President and Kissinger faced a new national security crisis triggered by the 
new entity of Palestinian terrorism which involved American citizens as hostages and 
how their policy of maintaining “moderate” Arab governments was juxtaposed against 
Kissinger’s pursuit of détente in the region.197  The President and Kissinger were troubled 
over whether the safety of the hostages was the primary concern at the start of the crisis 
or whether the possibility of the loss of Jordanian state could be prevented with the use of 
U.S. air and land forces.  Kissinger also considered whether or not the U.S. should 
encourage the Israelis to fill the void.  Either option would cause a shift in the balance of 
power in the region because the Soviets would intervene on behalf of the Arabs.  These 
events clearly show the President’s reluctance to elevate Middle East terrorism above a 
secondary concern as he chose to remain relatively hands-off, with the exception of 
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asking for armed guards and embargos.  Since TWA 840 the President and Kissinger 
agreed that counterterrorism was the responsibility of the State Department because it 
freed up the President and the NSC to focus on the more pressing issues of détente with 
the Soviets and on the Vietnam War.  This “official” detachment of the President and the 
NSC from counterterrorism harmed their efforts to effectively respond to the hijackings, 
rescue the hostages, and support King Hussein.  Because the President had instructed the 
State Department to work with the ICAO and other states to resolve the crisis the 
administration did not understand how to work with the Palestinian organizations 
directly; partly due to the fact that U.S. relationships with the Arab governments were 
hindered by the events of 1967 and the fact that negotiations through other parties worked 
in the TWA 840 case.   
The invasion of Syrian forces, supported by Soviet advisors, was a fear of the 
administration because the balance in the region could have been tipped if either the U.S. 
or Israelis retaliated.  This calculation by the NSC and Kissinger indicates that he 
understood the importance of the balance between the Soviets and the U.S. and the 
relationships between the Soviets and the radical Arab governments.  Kissinger’s choice 
to position C-130s and the Sixth Fleet indicates his uncertainty of whether interstate 
diplomacy could resolve the issue, or if U.S. military intervention was necessary to deter 
the radical Arab governments and the Soviets.   
Most importantly, these events show how hijackings, which used to be a 
“domestic inconvenience”, became “terrifying political theatre on [the] global stage.”198  
This political theater showed how Palestinian nationalists successfully used hijacking and 
guerilla warfare as their tool to bring their liberation movement to the global stage and 
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involve many different states and international organizations.  Even though the PFLP 
used hostages as their bargaining chip they were only successful in making political 
statements.  The fedayeen and the PLO were successful in earning the support of radical 
Arab governments for a time, but ultimately lost as the PLO fled to Beirut in 1971.  The 
administration was initially successful in its calls for increased security at U.S. airports 
and the adoption of the Hague Convention to combat hijackings, but they saw no need to 
pursue additional measures because no lives were lost.  The unsuccessful attempts by the 
PLO to create their own Palestinian state in Jordan meant that the administration was 
successful in its attempts to sustain King Hussein, but because the U.S. was not directly 
involved in the Cairo agreement violence and instability remained in Jordan for another 
year.  It was not until two years later that the President and Kissinger took Palestinian 
terrorism more seriously when their and international efforts failed to save lives in 
September 1972. 
The Munich Massacre 
Before sunrise on September 5, 1972, a twenty-three hour ordeal began which left 
eleven Israeli Olympic athletes, one West German police officer, and five Palestinian 
nationalists dead—all members of Black September Organization (BSO).  The BSO, 
posthumously named for the Black September incident in Jordan where the PLO was 
forcibly removed, was a very militant arm of the PLO, more specifically of Fatah.  Two 
Israelis were shot in the very beginning of the ordeal on September 5 by the members of 
BSO who broke into the Olympic Village in Munich housing the apartment building 
where the Israelis were sleeping.  Nine of the remaining Israeli athletes were taken 
hostage and soon shot to death in a shootout at the Fürstenfeldbruck airbase between the 
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BSO and West German police.199  This massacre played a crucial part in U.S. national 
security concerns as the terrorist attack once again brought into focus the need for 
international cooperation to combat transnational terrorism.  The event also triggered 
discussions within the administration about the safety of foreign officials/diplomats in the 
U.S. and the threat of Palestinian terrorism to the peace process.   
While the global community watched the events unfold live on their televisions 
the administration set up a task force in the State Department to deal with the situation 
and the Executive Protection Service was ordered to protect German, Israeli, Arab, and 
Soviet delegations in Washington and New York.200  President Nixon spoke to reporters 
on the Golden Gate Pier in San Francisco around one p.m. in the afternoon on September 
5 concerning the attack on Israeli athletes in Munich.  Nixon told the reporters that he 
spoke to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir on the phone and that “she could expect total 
cooperation from the Government of the United States in any way that would be helpful 
in obtaining the release of the hostages.”  The President said that he learned from Meir 
that Israeli intelligence knew nothing of the possibility of the attack and that these 
“international outlaws” would “stoop to anything in order to accomplish their goals.”  
Nixon said that the U.S. and Israel should work together in the future to “anticipate that 
Israeli citizens traveling abroad would be subjected to such activities in the future” and 
that the U.S. government only had the ability through diplomatic channels to voice their 
concerns if another attack happened outside the U.S.  Nixon also told the reporters that 
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the U.S. would work to provide proper intelligence and security for Israelis traveling in 
the U.S.201 
A memo from National Security staffer Samuel Hoskinson to Kissinger, said that 
the “terrorists” took the hostages to the airbase outside Munich and were demanding the 
release of 200 Arabs being held by Israel.  Hoskinson outlined the “stunned” attitudes in 
the embassy in Tel Aviv and that the public attitude towards the West Germans was 
already “sensitive.”  He felt that if something else should happen to the Israelis it would 
hurt the public attitudes towards peace with the Arabs.  Hoskinson also told Kissinger 
that the Israeli security forces were warned by West German security of a possible attack.  
The memo concludes by saying that the State Department:  
is at a loss over how to apply effective leverage on the terrorists.  The best they 
could come up with today was a cable to the major European capitals plus Jidda 
and Kuwait (the big financial contributors to the fedayeen) calling on them to use 
whatever influence they may have in Arab capitals or elsewhere to bring pressure 
to bear on the terrorists. 202 
 
During the evening of the September 5 the President and Kissinger were concerned about 
Israeli anger.  Israeli officials wanted the U.S. to pressure the International Olympic 
Committee to cancel the remainder of the games in protest.  Kissinger—whose ability to 
directly shape the diplomatic responses to terrorism after Rogers’s humiliation over the 
second Rogers Plan and Black September—met with General Haig to attempt to 
discourage the Israelis from this idea because they knew that Nixon (who they did not 
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wake up for this discussion) saw that this scenario would play into the hands of the 
Palestinians.203   
In another memo from Hoskinson to Kissinger on September 6, Hoskinson called 
the attempt by the West German police to rescue the hostages and the resulting loss of the 
lives of the nine remaining Israelis was the “most dramatic and outrageous incident since 
fedayeen radicals hijacked five [sic] aircraft over Labor Day weekend two years ago.”  
He advised Kissinger to direct other officials to take a “statesmanlike posture” since there 
was little that could be done at that point.204  The concern over the Munich massacre to 
U.S. national security became evident in conversations between Nixon, General Haig, 
Rogers, and U.S. Attorney General Richard Kleindienst.  In those conversations Haig 
said that he was worried that the Israelis would respond to the crisis by possibly attacking 
Lebanon.  Ten minutes later Nixon told Haig that “any nation that harbors or gives 
sanctuary to these international outlaws we will cut off all economic support—obviously 
Lebanon.  Jordan’s another.”  Haig replied, “We may have some Chinese problem on 
this” and Nixon responded, “Screw the Chinese on this one.  Be very tough.”   
General Haig then called Rogers and told him of Nixon’s request to “break 
relations with nations that harbor or give sanctuary to these guerrillas.”  Rogers protested, 
“He can’t do that, especially when we don’t know which nations.  What we are trying to 
do tonight—we are trying to get some protection against a JDL [Jewish Defense League] 
blowup.  We are taking whatever security precautions there are to take.”  Haig 
commented that he told Nixon this and Rogers believed that, “we did everything we 
could.  We got in touch with the Olympic Delegation, sent out telegrams, talked to the 
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German Government . . . and . . . talked today about what kind of reprisals we might 
make.”  Haig, wanting to cool the situation, suggested that “tomorrow we should call for 
calm” and Rogers said, “There are financial angles—Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.”  Haig 
agreed to the financial angles and said, “he always wants to do something.  We have to be 
careful not to do something he will regret.”   
Later that night Nixon called Haig and said that he wanted to go to the Israelis’ 
funerals, but Haig feared that it would be a “slap for the Germans” who were already 
getting criticism.  Haig then called Rogers about the matter of attending the funeral and 
Rogers suggested “a day of mourning in Washington with flags at half mast.”  Haig, 
worried, replied that “all I am worried about is some cynics coming back and saying, 
‘You are bombing the hell out of Vietnam.’”  Rogers replied, “I suppose they will say 
that, but for Christ’s sake, it is like somebody you shouldn’t have gone to the funeral or 
something.”  Haig agreed and called Attorney General Kleindienst about the day of 
mourning.205 
In a conversation between Nixon, Kissinger, Rogers, and Haig on September 6 
they discussed what should be the U.S. reaction to Munich.  President Nixon told 
Kissinger that he wanted Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to go to the International 
Olympic Committee and tell them that the Munich games should proceed.  Nixon feared 
that the terrorists wanted the U.S. and Israel to pull out of the games or even call for a 
cancellation of the games, but if they continued it would not draw more attention then 
what had already been drawn.  Kissinger suggested that Rogers should go to the United 
Nations and get the Security Council to discuss international rules on the harboring of 
terrorists.  He believed this was a way of preventing Israeli retaliation and involving the 
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international community on the issue.206  Rogers agreed that it would prevent retaliation 
on the part of Israel.207  President Nixon continued to press Kissinger on Rogers’s earlier 
suggestion for the lowering the flags, but Kissinger argued this may be inappropriate 
because the U.S. did not do it for the deaths of Irishmen in Belfast.  Nixon agreed and 
suggested that he would make a sudden appearance at a church in Washington during the 
time of the funeral for the athletes as to make it a personal statement rather than a 
national one.208 
The President was concerned about the domestic fallout after Munich because of 
the “trouble with the Jews.”  He told Kissinger and Haig, “is that they’ve always played 
these thinks in terms of outrage.  You’ve got the Jewish Defense League raising hell and 
saying we ought to kill every Arab diplomat.”  The President feared what the American 
Jewish community would do in response to Munich.  “You don’t really know, Henry, 
what the Jewish community will do on this.  It’s going to be the goddamnest thing you’ve 
ever saw.” The President called the Palestinian terrorists “international outlaws” who are 
unpredictable and was upset that Lebanon allowed the PLO to stay in Beirut after they 
were kicked out of Jordan.  The President’s Chief of Staff, Haldeman, agreed with the 
President and told him that they must find a way to solve the situation.  Nixon responded 
by saying that Rogers was seeking suggestions from other states.209 
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Kissinger’s concerns were more focused on the international fallout as he feared 
that Israelis would start another Middle East War over Munich.  Kissinger told the 
President that he feared the Israelis would react like the Austrians in World War I and 
invade Lebanon.210  However, the administration’s fears came true as Israeli air forces 
attacked PLO bases in Syria and Beirut.  Three Syrian jets were destroyed as was a 
railway between Syria and Beirut.  Nixon was willing to accept the invasion, but feared 
that Israelis would soon attack much larger targets.211     
In a conversation between Israeli ambassador to the U.S. Yitzhak Rabin and 
Rogers, Rabin expressed his concern over the possibility of an anti-terrorist agreement 
failing to pass in the Security Council with China as the President of the Council.  Rogers 
assured Rabin that it would be passed as they were buttressing the proposal with anti-
hijacking legislation as a means to pass it through the council. Rabin then wanted the 
U.S. government to speak with Arab states believed to support terrorists, to “explain to 
Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus that as long as they offered their territory as refuge for 
groups acting against Israel, or as staging areas for actions in their states, they would 
have to take responsibility,” and to ask European governments to make efforts against 
“terrorist organizations” within Europe.  Rogers and Rabin then agreed that Munich 
could hurt the peace process and that it played into the hands of those who committed the 
act, which was a major component of the secular Palestinian nationalist agenda.  The 
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meeting ended with an agreement that the games should go on and that both sides would 
recommend an increase in security.212 
In a telegram to his embassies, Rogers said that the President had placed him in 
control of mobilizing the international community to combat terrorism.  He also wanted 
the staff in the embassies to work with leaders in Arab governments to convince them 
that their support of Arab terrorists was not in the best interests of their states.  These 
actions by the terrorist harmed Middle East peace and Munich had “markedly raised 
tension in the Middle East.”  He concluded by instructing his staff to tell the Arab 
governments that they should publicly condemn the BSO and all fedayeen for their acts 
of terrorism.213  U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, George H.W. 
Bush, was instructed on September 14 to forward a letter to UN Secretary General Kurt 
Waldheim from Rogers about the U.S. interests in continuing a dialogue on the 
combating of terrorism.214  With the letter forwarded to Waldheim, the UN General 
Assembly made room on the agenda to discuss the combating of terrorism.   
In a memo to Nixon, Rogers outlined other steps taken to combat terrorism 
including the creation of two special committees in the Department of State under Deputy 
Secretary, John Irwin.  One was to encourage international cooperation to combat 
terrorism chaired by Assistant Secretary, Joseph Sisco, and the second to “protect foreign 
persons and in the United States” chaired by Deputy Under Secretary, William 
Macomber.  These special committees coordinated an increased effort to screen more 
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closely the Visa applications of potential terrorists, look at how to observe and tighten 
controls over foreign organizations with ties to terrorism, and directed the U.S. 
representatives to work with INTERPOL to develop a program to use their resources to 
combat transnational terrorism.215 
A week after the Israeli airstrikes on PLO targets in Syria and Lebanon, Israeli 
armored divisions invaded southern Lebanon and destroyed 130 homes of suspected 
Palestinian militants.216  In response the President in his meeting with George H.W. 
Bush, Rogers and Kissinger identified Munich as a test of U.S.-Israeli relations.217  The 
administration learned of the possibility that Israel’s friends in Congress were beginning 
to influence public sympathies regarding Soviet unwillingness to allow for the free 
emigration of Soviet Jews.  The administration believed that the play on public 
sympathies aimed to undermine détente.  The President and Nixon agreed that Israel 
might use Munich as a way to force the U.S. to pressure Moscow to allow the emigration 
through measures other than détente with the Soviets.218  Later that day, the President 
realized that Munich was not a strain on détente, but preventing future terrorist attacks 
and the safety of foreign diplomats in the U.S. remained a national security concern.   
A very rare and strange moment in U.S. history occurred as the President learned 
of some troubling information from alleged psychic Jeanne Dixon.  After Rogers, Bush, 
and Kissinger left the Oval Office, the President used his secretary, Rose Mary Woods, to 
learn about Dixon’s latest prophetic vision.  The President learned, by way of Woods, of 
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Dixon’s prophesy that a major terrorist attack would occur against either an Israeli 
official in the U.S. or an American political figure.219  Later that evening, Nixon called 
Haig to see if the FBI had developed any contingency plans to protect foreign diplomats 
in Washington and New York.220       
At this point Kissinger still saw the main fallout of Munich was the threat of 
Israeli overreaction that could cause another war.  Kissinger developed the idea of a 
cabinet level committee to deter the Israelis by showing that the U.S. was hard on 
international terrorism.  Kissinger saw this committee as small gesture towards the 
Israelis, but the President saw it more as an opportunity to combat the major terrorist 
event prophesized by Dixon.  On September 21, the President confessed the source of his 
concerns about potential terrorism to Kissinger and that  
They are desperate that they will kidnap somebody.  They may shoot 
somebody…We have got to have a plan.  Suppose they kidnap Rabin, Henry, and 
demand that we release all blacks who are prisoners around the United States, and 
we didn’t and they shoot him? What, the Christ, do we do?  We are going to give 
in to it…We have got to have contingency plans for hijacking, for kidnapping, for 
all sorts of things happen around here.221 
 
Kissinger drew up the plans for the committee the over the next few days even though he 
and the NSC did not see it as more than a gesture.  The President insisted that the 
directors of the FBI and CIA be members of the committee in order to help protect 
Israelis and American Jews.222 
On September 25, Nixon sent a memo to the “heads of important departments and 
agencies” which outlined his desire to establish a Cabinet Committee to Combat 
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Terrorism (CCCT), to be chaired by Rogers.  This CCCT would look at possible means 
to combat terrorism “here and abroad” and develop governmental procedures to combat 
transnational terrorism “swiftly and effectively.”  The CCCT was to be made up of the 
Secretaries of State, Defense and Transportation, the Attorney General, the U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN, the Directors of the CIA and FBI, and the Assistants to the 
President for the National Security Affairs and Domestic Affairs.223  Even though the 
CCCT was a cabinet level committee to combat terrorism it met only once during the 
administration in October 1972.  Following the establishment of the Cabinet Committee, 
Rogers oversaw the coordinating of inter-agency intelligence, the tightened control over 
Visas and the procedures involved in immigration and customs, contingency planning if a 
terrorist attack was to occur in the U.S., and improvement of relations between the CCCT 
and Congress.224 
The anti-terrorism actions in the UN General Assembly were summarized in 
documents prepared by NSC staffers, Richard Kennedy and Fernando Rondon to 
Kissinger.  They said that the UN Secretary General, Waldheim, would bring up the 
agenda item of terrorism on November 1 and that the Department of State hoped that it 
will draft a UN working group to tackle the issue in the following year.  They continued 
on to say that the “Terrorism Convention” as of date provided for punishment or 
extradition of individuals who commit terrorism, i.e., murder and kidnapping “outside the 
terrorist’s state of nationality; outside the territory of the state at which the terror is 
                                                
223 Memorandum from Nixon to the Heads of Departments and Agencies, “Action to Combat Terrorism,” 
25 September 1972, United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-1, 
Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972, 1:109; and Memorandum from Nixon to Rogers, “Action to 
Combat Terrorism,” 25 September 1972, FRUS, 1969-1972 E-1: 110. 




directed, i.e., the Munich Olympics; within the territory of the state at which the terror is 
directed but against third country nationals, i.e., the Lod Airport killings.”  In another 
memo to Kissinger, Kennedy outlined how in the General Assembly there has been a 
discussion over “jurisdictional responsibilities” so that a government can respond 
“quickly, effectively and in full cooperation.”225    The text of the terrorism resolution as 
it was adopted by the General Assembly condemned terrorism against innocent people, 
“invites states to take all appropriate measures at the national level, with a view to the 
speedy and final elimination of the problem [terrorism],” and called for the creation of a 
UN ad hoc committee to look further into the terrorism convention.226 
Following Nixon’s promise to Meir in his September 5 phone conversation the 
House of Representatives passed H.R. 15883 on October 24, 1972 “making acts of 
terrorism against foreign diplomats and specified guest a federal offense.”227  This gave 
the government the authority to deal with such acts in a manner that would be swift and 
effective.  The act allowed for the use of Secret Service and Executive Protection Service 
agents to protect foreign dignitaries at diplomatic posts in Washington and at UN 
missions in New York City.228   The passage of this act was a result of encouragement by 
Secretary Rogers and President Nixon.   
§ 
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Perhaps the most frightening aspect of Munich was not that it involved “lunatic 
acts of terrorism, abduction and blackmail, which tear asunder the web of international 
life,” but a photograph in the New York Times of  one of the BSO members wearing a ski 
mask looking down from the balcony outside the apartment where the Israeli athletes 
were attacked. 229  This frightening image of a Palestinian terrorist with his face covered 
provided the image of the evilness spawned by Palestinian nationalism against innocent 
Israeli athletes at the peaceful Olympic Games.  The Israelis responded to this image and 
the dealth of their citizens through “Operation Wrath of God” to assassinate those 
responsible for the Munich Massacre.  Organized under “Committee X” which was lead 
by Meir, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, General Aharon Yarviv, and Mossad 
Director Yvi Zamir, they organized a list of targets made up of BSO and PLO members 
who would be killed to prevent future attacks against Israel.230    
Beyond the photograph and the Mossad assassinations, the Munich massacre 
brought forth perceptions of transnational terrorism in the administration and associated it 
with a national security crisis.  This attack brought into question how not only the U.S. 
should respond to this attack, but also how Israel should respond, and whether backing 
out of the Olympics would play into the hands of the Palestinian nationalists.  By 
stimulating debates between Nixon’s advisors over how the U.S. should give their 
condolences demonstrates how important the U.S. image is seen around the world, but 
more importantly in the Middle East.231  Within the Nixon administration, concerns 
developed over how the attack could have an impact on a peace process and America’s 
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interests in the region.  The establishment of an official White House cabinet committee 
(the CCCT) is also an indication of how important the perceptions of transnational 
terrorism and the association with U.S. national security in the Nixon administration 
evolved since the Labor Day hijackings. 
More physical evidence of the impacts of the massacre on the President and 
Kissinger was the change in how the State Department handled foreign visitors.  The 
federal government ended the program that allowed 600,000 visitors to remain in the U.S. 
for ten days without prior screening or approval.  As of September 27, 1972 all foreign 
visitors, except for Canadians, had to be screened and have visas to enter the U.S.  The 
State Department also created Operation Boulder that developed safeguards against the 
entry of foreign terrorists and their sympathizers.  The operation also permitted the FBI, 
CIA, and Immigration and Naturalization Service to screen the visas and ensure that a 
five-day waiting period was observed.232  With that said, Palestinian terrorism remained 
only a secondary concern as the President and Kissinger continued to pursue détente, the 
peace process, and dealt with Vietnam.   
The Khartoum Incident 
 According to an intelligence memo dated June 1973, Palestinian terrorists 
attacked the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan on March 1, 1973.233  This was 
a result of the renewed relations between the U.S. and Sudan, which wanted to aid the 
U.S. in bringing Egypt and Libya under the umbrella of the West.  The Sudanese 
President Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiry told U.S. ambassador to the U.N. George H.W. 
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Bush during their meeting in February 1972 that, ‘the Sudan could assist any initiative 
which the U.S. might undertake, provided he [Nimeiry] felt it serious and genuine and 
provided that any action he was called on to take would not embarrass or weaken Egypt.’  
The Sudanese President also offered to setup a meeting between Libya’s leader, 
Muammar Gadhafi, and Bush who considered it as an opportunity worth trying if 
Secretary Rogers decided that that Nimeiry’s suggestion was worth the attempt.  
Washington turned down the meeting, but resumed official diplomatic relations in August 
of 1972.234   
During the early morning hours of March 1, eight BSO terrorists, four of whom, 
jumped from a speeding Land Rover and seized the embassy during a diplomatic 
reception honoring the departure of the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), George 
Moore.235  After wounding the U.S. Ambassador, Cleo Noel, Jr., and the Belgian Charge 
d’Affaires, Guy Eid, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Sudan and the Jordanian Charge 
d’Affaires were all taken hostage.236  Ambassador Noel was shot in the ankle and DCM 
Moore was beaten on the head with a gun, and both were eventually tied up with the 
Jordanian and Belgian officials and placed in a separate room. The Saudi ambassador and 
his wife were not tied up, but were forced to served tea and food to the BSO members.  
The BSO members demanded the release of several hundred Palestinians in foreign jails, 
a Fatah leader being held in Jordan, and the release of Sirhan Sirhan, the assassin of 
Robert F. Kennedy.237  The attack was planned and carried out by the BSO members 
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under the “full knowledge of Yasser Arafat.”  The primary goal of the attack, according 
to the intelligence report, was “to strike at the United States because of its efforts to 
achieve a Middle East peace settlement which many Arabs believe would be inimical to 
Palestinian interests.”   
The State Department wanted to initially pursue negotiations because of their 
successes in Damascus in 1969 and at Dawson Field in 1970.  Rogers dispatched Under 
Secretary of State William Macomber to the Sudan to begin the negotiations.  The 
terrorists demanded that Sirhan Sirhan be released, a concession that no U.S. leader 
would allow.  During the hijackings in 1970, the U.S. learned that the PFLP wanted the 
release of Sirhan Sirhan, but the rumor turned out to be false when the PFLP did not ask 
for his release.  Negotiations were mediated primarily between the Sudanese Ministers of 
Interior and Health and no effort was spared in attempting to secure the release of all of 
the hostages.238  The Khartoum incident would bring the U.S. interests in the Middle 
East, the peace process and their relationship will Arab leaders in the region into question 
as this terrorist event would put these national security concerns in jeopardy. 
During President Nixon’s news conference on March 2, he was asked what the 
U.S. government was going to do to release Noel and Moore.  Nixon replied that the U.S. 
government “will do anything we can to get them released,” and after the President was 
asked about Sirhan Sirhan he said “but we will not pay blackmail.”239  The President 
appeared to be blowing off steam, but there is no evidence that the administration would 
follow the President’s pledge. According to some, uncertainly remains about whether the 
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NSC considered a policy of “no concessions” before Khartoum.  However, with the 
President’s public statement of not giving into blackmail the administration was forced to 
throw out the five-year old policy of negotiations.240 
On the night of March 2, the BSO members ordered the Americans and the 
Belgian Charge to write their will and each requested to speak to their wives, but their 
request was denied.  Noel and Moore were taken aside and machine gunned to death.  
The Belgian Charge was told that he was being killed for the death of BSO terrorists who 
were killed at the Lod Airport after the 1972 Sabena hijacking.241  Learning of the slaying 
of the two American diplomats the President said in a statement, “the United States is 
emphasizing its strong feelings that the perpetrators of this crime must be brought to 
justice” and this was another example for all nations to work together to combat 
transnational terrorism.242  Under Secretary Macomber agreed with the President that the 
U.S. should not pay any ransom and that “the terrorists must know we have a hard line 
and will provide no reward.”243  After 34 hours, Yasser Arafat in Beirut ordered the BSO 
members to release the remaining hostages and to surrender to the Sudanese 
authorities.244   
In response to the killing of some of the hostages Harold Saunders, a NSC staffer 
responsible for the Middle East, proposed the strategy to the President and Kissinger that 
because unilateral actions by the U.S. might upset the moderate Arab governments—
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always a primary concern of the administration—that instead they should provide quiet 
encouragement of the moderate Arab governments to deal with the BSO.  The U.S. had 
known for some time that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were responsible for funding Fatah, 
and indirectly BSO, so Saunders suggested that Kissinger should not advise the President 
to demand counterterrorism measures from any Arab state the administration wished to 
encourage because it might jeopardize the peace process.245  As a result, Rogers sent a 
request to Macomber to ask the Sudanese government to take responsibility to 
“administer just punishment to the terrorists.”  Rogers also circulated memos to other 
states that any state that offered “asylum” to “these terrorists would incur the ill will of 
the United States government.”  Lastly, Rogers made it clear that the U.S. knew which 
Arab governments supported the BSO and was considering measures of how to punish 
those states.246 
Following the deaths of Noel and Moore in the Khartoum incident the New York 
Times reported that U.S. hands were tied in the situation as the government was not 
influential in Sudan since diplomatic relations were only restored a year earlier after 
being severed following the Six Day War in 1967.  The State Department sent a task 
force headed by Armin H. Meyer soon followed by another task force of ten individuals 
formed under the CCCT.247  Following the Khartoum incident U.S. embassies abroad 
asked for more security personnel and equipment to prevent another terrorist attack.  
However, according to the article this request occurred at the end of the fiscal year when 
the State Department was short on funds making it difficult to respond to those requests.  
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The article also said that psychologically the diplomats were stressed and even one was 
frightened by a car that backfired in Cairo.248       
In Nixon’s March 6 speech at the ceremony commemorating the slain American 
diplomats he expressed his strong feelings and perceptions that transnational terrorism 
was associated with a U.S. national security crisis that the U.S. government must deal 
with on the domestic and international levels: 
I am quite aware of the fact that there are some governments who take the 
line that since they are not the targets of the terrorists, they can stand aside and 
not join in any international effort to be firm against terrorism, whether it is in the 
United Nations or bilaterally or multilaterally with other nations. 
 
I would only suggest this: The nation that compromises with the terrorists 
today could well be destroyed by the terrorists tomorrow.  And as far as we are 
concerned, we therefore feel we are on very sound ground calling upon the whole 
world community to join together in a firm stand against international outlaws 
who today endanger the nationals of one country, maybe the United States, and 
tomorrow will endanger the lives of others.249 
 
The attack in Khartoum shows the relationship between Fatah and the BSO because a 
local Sudanese Fatah vehicle was used to transport them to the embassy.  The report also 
demonstrates that the U.S. was emerging as a “primary fedayeen target” which could be 
attacked when “least expected.”250 
 In a memo of conversation between the Sudanese Minister of National Reform, 
Abdel Abdullah, and President Nixon, Sudanese President Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiry 
expressed his condolences for the loss of the two Americans.  Minister Abdullah 
requested the assistance of the U.S. in the form of equipment, expertise, and training to 
combat international terrorism.  President Nixon understood the Sudanese concerns and 
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responded that the attack in Khartoum could have happened anywhere and that the U.S. 
was limited on what to do if another attack happened because the U.S. was outside its 
realm of legal sovereignty in the state under a terrorist attack.  However, Nixon said that 
the Sudanese government should not be expected to “deal firmly” with the attacks unless 
it was backed up by the U.S. government, which Nixon assured Abdullah, would be the 
case.251  In a briefing memo from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David 
Newsom, to Secretary of State, Kissinger detailed the U.S. assistance to the Sudanese 
government.  The U.S. AID’s Office of Public Safety would sponsor two Sudanese 
Security Officials to attend an eight week Technical Investigation Course.  The course 
would outline in detail bomb detection and disposal techniques.  The second part of the 
plan is still redacted, but the third part of the plan detailed the plans for two FAA officials 
to fly to Sudan to improve airport security.252 
U.S. Ambassador to Sudan, William Brewer, in a memo to President Nixon 
suggested that a letter be sent to President Nimeiry thanking him for the “steadfastness” 
of the Sudanese legal process and that the President should assure Nimeiry that just 
sentences should be given and completed.  The drafted lettered attached to the memo 
pointed out the importance of Nimeiry’s political authority in that part of the Arab world 
and that the U.S. government and the American people should understand the delicacy of 
the matter to Middle East peace.253  In response to Brewer’s telegram, the Department of 
State suggested that the letter with the President’s concerns might appear to the Arab 
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world as “undue pressure.”  The recommendation was that Brewer would meet with 
Nimeiry after a guilty verdict and express an oral demarche.254  
The BSO terrorists were sentenced to life terms after their conviction on June 24, 
1974, but Sudanese President Nimeiry commuted their sentences to seven years and 
released them into the custody of the PLO to carry out the sentences as the ‘legitimate 
representatives of the Palestine people.’255  In an angry telegram from Secretary 
Kissinger to Ambassador Brewer, Kissinger ordered Brewer to express “dismay and 
extreme disappointment over this virtual release of these confessed murderers of 
diplomatic representatives of two governments, including personal representatives of 
President Nixon.”  Kissinger also wanted Brewer to remind the Sudanese President of 
“his repeated assurances that appropriate justice would be rendered.”  The seven year 
punishment was seen by Kissinger as inadequate and that it would have a negative impact 
on public and Congressional opinion in the U.S.256  In a memo from Brewer to Kissinger 
he outlined his conversation with Nimeiry about the commuting of the sentence.  In his 
conversation on June 26, Nimeiry said that other states have held other Palestinian 
terrorists for shorter periods and given them lesser sentences.  Nimeiry also noted that the 
release of the terrorists would lessen the tensions surrounding the peace process.  Nimeiry 
concluded the conversation by saying there had been several reports about an attempt on 
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his life and as a result of those reports the decision was based on Arab and Sudanese 
opinion.257 
In a document prepared by the new Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, Donald Easum, to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph Sisco, it 
was made clear that the U.S. reaction to Nimeiry’s commuting of the sentences was 
important to analyze.  On the basis of national security, the U.S. reaction may harm U.S. 
bilateral relations with Sudan and most importantly the credibility of U.S. policy towards 
terrorism.  Easum advised Sisco that they should take into consideration how it will affect 
the U.S. position in the Arab world, especially U.S. relations toward Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia.  Also, Sisco should take under consideration the U.S. role in the Middle East, i.e., 
(the peace process).  Easum then provided a Pro/Con argument about four possible 
options of U.S. relations with Sudan: the freezing of future assistance to Sudan, the 
“moderate cutback” in diplomatic ties, “severe cutback in ties over foreseeable future,” 
and the break of diplomatic relations.258  This document was important as it explicitly 
details the important national security concerns following the Khartoum incident by two 
important Department of State officials.  It noted the importance of diplomatic ties with 
Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia which could be damaged due to their differing stances on 
the issue, and most importantly the appearance of the U.S. in the Arab world and the 
success of the peace process. The Department of State decided to downplay diplomatic 
relations with Sudan and outlined how this would proceed in a telegram to the U.S. 
Embassy in Sudan.  It outlined the effect of the decline in relations would influence U.S. 
economic aid to Sudan, the sales of military material and training, and the eventual return 
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of Brewer to the embassy.259  This advice by Easum and the decision by the State 
Department to downplay diplomatic ties only underlined Kissinger’s concern about the 
Khartoum incident’s impact on U.S. relations with Arab leaders and the Palestinian 
groups.260   
Evidence of the impact of the Khartoum incident on Kissinger’s Middle East 
policy can be seen first in U.S. Charge d’Affaires Allen Berlind’s in a telegram to the 
State Department which outlined the possible U.S. relations with Sudan as “the half-
breed poor boy of the Arab world.”  Berlind said that this “half-breed” status meant that 
Sudan does not have a substantial voice in regional affairs where U.S. had an interest.  Of 
the four policy recommendations made by Berlind, he thought that Brewer’s return to 
Khartoum to meet with senior Sudanese officials to discuss possible U.S. policies was the 
best option for the reestablishment of formal diplomatic relations with the Sudan.  
However, if Berlind himself met with the senior officials first he could overcome the 
potential collapse of relations.  Berlind would also have the ability to negotiate for the 
return of Brewer to the embassy if he met with the senior officials first.261 
According to a telegram sent from the Embassy in Rabat, Morocco to the Saudi 
Foreign Minister, Ambassador Brewer was to return to Khartoum.  In this forwarded 
message from Kissinger, Brewer would return to discuss the U.S. government’s proposed 
policies.  Brewer would also make the attempt to meet with Nimeiry when the time was 
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best.262  After discussions between Brewer and the Sudanese interim Foreign Minister 
Jamal Muhammad Ahmed, Brewer said that the “favorable action [to] be taken in order 
to begin getting our bilateral relations here back in gear” was to first restore economic 
and military aid.263  
In a telegram from Brewer to Kissinger, Brewer said the Egyptian President, 
Anwar Sadat, might ask the U.S. government to “normalize” U.S.-Sudan relations.  
Brewer said that Sadat may ask this because of Nimeiry’s support for a Middle East 
peace process, mainly his support of Sinai II.264  The Ambassador also recommended that 
in the wake of renewed Export-Import Bank contracts with Sudan in May 1975 the U.S. 
should reconsider PL-480 food sales to the Sudanese Government and open a Defense 
Attaché office in Khartoum.265   
In a conversation between Kissinger, Acting Assistant Secretary Talcott Seelye, 
and Ambassador Deng, Kissinger expressed the government’s displeasure with the 
release of the BSO terrorists and that Foreign Service officers felt as though they were 
betrayed.  He also wanted to express that he would speak to the new President Gerald R. 
Ford about the normalization of relations with Sudan and arrange a visit between 
Presidents Ford and Nimeiry in June.266  Following the discussion between Kissinger and 
Deng on April 7, Deng coordinated Nimeiry’s visit in June which “demonstrate[d] his 
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good will.”  A memo to President Ford said Sudan was important to U.S. initiatives in the 
Middle East, especially in supporting Sinai II.  Also, that if the private meeting between 
the Presidents would happen it would provide the needed “psychological boost to our 
relation that the Sudanese so ardently desire.”267  On June 10, 1976, President Ford and 
President Nimeiry met in the Oval Office and had an hour long conversation.  Both were 
very cordial to each other and both appreciated that normal relations have been restored.  
Ford thanked Nimeiry for his support of Sinai II and the special relationship he developed 
among Middle East leaders.268   
In a telegram to Brewer in Washington, D.C. from the Embassy in Sudan, the 
advice was given to Brewer to make it clear that during the period of strong “pro-
American” and “Anti-Soviet” feelings in Sudan it was recommended that the U.S. should 
strengthen its relations.269  During this period of normal relations with Sudan, President 
Ford signed the “Presidential Determination 77-5” on November 5 which said, “that the 
sale of defense articles and defense services to the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Sudan will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world 
peace.”  This was signed following a recommendation by Ford’s National Security 
Advisor, General Brent Scowcroft, that providing this defense aid would enable Sudan to 
maintain relations with neighboring states like Egypt and peace in the Red Sea area.270  
On November 16, Ford approved a grant of $400,000 in communication equipment and 
training for the Sudanese government to combat terrorism.271 
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The Khartoum incident represented another instance of how a stateless nationalist 
organization through terrorism was effective at entering the geopolitical debate about the 
Middle East region (specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict).  The Nixon and Ford 
administrations saw the murder of two American diplomats as a major national security 
crisis around the effectiveness of counterterrorism policy and safety of foreign diplomats 
at home and abroad.  The fact that a Palestinian nationalist organization had the 
capability to take hostages at a foreign embassy raised concerns in the State Department.  
Embassies abroad made requests for additional funding to prevent another attack, but the 
budget was nearing the end of a fiscal year and unable to provide the necessary funding.  
Commuting the sentences of the terrorists by Nimeiry was a national security crisis in and 
of itself as the Nixon administration felt that a promise of justice was broken.  The 
administration did not see the benefit of leaving the punishment of the terrorists with the 
PLO, the organization whose leader (Arafat) ordered the murder of the diplomats.   
The temporary downplay in diplomatic relations with the Sudan by the U.S. 
government was also another national security issue.  If the U.S. no longer had normal 
ties with Sudan it would lose a relationship with a state that was a neighbor to Egypt—a 
country of major interest to U.S. policy in the Middle East.  The government also had to 
manage very carefully their reaction to Nimeiry’s decision to ensure that the image of the 
U.S. in Africa and the Middle East would not be harmed.  Restoring relations with Sudan 
following Nimeiry’s support of Sinai II (an agreement brokered by Secretary of State 
Kissinger) demonstrated that the government understood once again Sudan’s importance 
to the peace process.  Ford’s decision to allow for the sale of defense materials, training, 
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and communication equipment showed how important it was to have another country 
working on the international level to combat transnational terrorism. 
Most importantly, Kissinger’s actions during Khartoum make clear that his 
Middle East policy was still an extension of the principles that shaped détente, principles 
that were completely unsuited to handle the fact that the BSO was a non-state actor who 
could not be influenced by interstate diplomacy and international organizations.  
Kissinger was successful in addressing terrorism as a short-term concern through his 
ability to shape policy that would actively influence the Sudanese government’s 
involvement in the trial and detainment of those involved in the assassinations.  Even 
though the terrorists were released into the custody of the PLO, the U.S. government 
continued to see terrorism as a secondary problem that was overshadowed by Kissinger’s 
diplomatic tactic of de-escalation of diplomatic relations with the Sudan as a potential 
measure to punish them for Nimeiry’s actions.  However, Kissinger would realize the 
shortfalls of the policy and how it could negatively affect the balance in the region.  With 
Watergate scandal about to overcome President Nixon, U.S. position in Vietnam, the era 
of negotiations still underway between the U.S. and the Soviets, Kissinger and the NSC 













CONCLUSION: Henry Kissinger and Transnational Palestinian Terrorism 
Journalist Eric Pace in his March 4, 1973 article “Again the Men in Masks; Again 
the Deaths of Hostages” made a dark and grim parallel between the Munich massacre and 
the Khartoum incident.  Eerily similar images of the masked BSO terrorist standing on 
the balcony in Munich was beneath a photo of a masked BSO member on a balcony 
outside the Saudi embassy in Khartoum.  Pace provided an alarming narrative of the 
events which happened in Khartoum outlining how the masked men’s demands were not 
met and lives again were lost just as they were in Munich.  But the most striking part of 
his article is the very negative and dark language expressed in the last paragraph:  
Nor is there much that governments can do in concert, since there are many Arab 
extremists, in one country or another, who want to help the fedayeen.  And, as the 
commandos boast, each new crop of Palestinian schoolboys produces its share of 
fanatical youngsters who want to be masked men, holding tommyguns, shocking 
the world.272  
 
This paragraph summed up completely and most eloquently what the Palestinian 
nationalist liberation movement had become since 1967 and how transnational terrorism 
                                                




threatened U.S. national security.  As these masked men stood before the public on eerily 
similar balconies they performed their acts of terrorism to promote their nationalist 
agenda. The fact that masked men could succeed twice and that lives were lost proves 
how the transnational terrorism challenged Kissinger’s pursuit of détente in the Middle 
East and how his realist worldview caused him to draw the wrong lessons from history in 
terms of his ability to address the new problem of Palestinian terrorism.   
These wrong lessons drawn by Kissinger were his reorganization of the limits of 
U.S. power and interstate diplomacy in the Vietnam era. However, Kissinger soon fell 
back on his knowledge of the nineteenth century concert of Europe model of interactions 
among states and their charismatic leaders as the administration’s way forward.  In the 
postcolonial world, and the Middle East in particular, non-state actors such as the PLO 
factions were undergoing the process of becoming some of the most important elements 
in the determination of the Middle East foreign policy.   
Ultimately, the President and Kissinger’s inability to understand the transnational 
nature of the Palestinian terrorism was due to the fact that they were non-state actors who 
performed extraterritorial terrorist attacks against domestic and foreign targets in a region 
that was considered to be an area of secondary importance after South-east Asia.  
Kissinger’s realism, which was shaped by his experience in Germany and as an academic 
fashioned the administration’s interstate diplomacy as the primary avenue to ensure 
détente with the Soviet Union.  Kissinger saw détente as the cornerstone of his foreign 
policy as a result of his experiences that appeasement did not work to solve disputes 
between states during the interwar period’s collapse of the European state system.273    
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With détente as the cornerstone of his foreign policy Kissinger was able to work 
within the postcolonial geopolitical system to decrease tensions between the two 
superpowers (the U.S. and Soviet Union) while he linked other diplomatic issues together 
in order to reach agreements on Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and nuclear arms treaties.  In 
each of these areas President Nixon and Kissinger were in sole control of the diplomatic 
decision making because of their efforts to restructure the National Security Council and 
isolate the State Department from the process.  The secret back channel established by 
the President represented another instance where Kissinger through his discussions with 
Dobrynin made possible Kissinger’s free rein in shaping the administration’s foreign 
policy.  The fact that the official diplomatic decision making process on the Middle East 
was left to the State Department also shaped the inability of the President and Kissinger 
to address the terrorism directly.  Finally, the precedent was established in 1969 that the 
State Department was to act as the sole agency responsible for negotiations and the 
overseer of counterterrorism policy. 
 The hijacking of the four airliners with European, Israeli and American citizens 
aboard and holding them hostage in the Jordanian desert placed the Nixon administration 
in a difficult position of trying to gain the release of the hostages while they maintained 
the stability of the Hussein regime in Jordan.  The President and Kissinger allowed the 
State Department to use multilateral measures to develop ways to punish the states that 
provided asylum to the terrorists.  These measures resulted in possible U.S. sanctions that 
would later be adopted by ICAO.  Because these sanctions were only directed at the 
states that offered the asylum and not at the PFLP indicates that Kissinger’s regional 
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policy was not suited to handle the stateless Palestinian organizations directly.  
 Black September presented many of the same challenges the administration faced 
with the PFLP.  The PLO and the fedayeen forces in Jordan pursued an armed struggle 
against King Hussein’s Jordan, a moderate Arab government that was an essential part of 
Kissinger’s policy of maintaining the balance of power in the region.  The persistent 
concern over Soviet support against Hussein on behalf of Syria or Iraq was present in the 
minds of the administration.  Even with this concern the administration pursued the 
possibility of Israeli involvement in the crisis in order to maintain Jordan’s stability, but 
also removed any possibility of direct U.S. military involvement which might cause 
Soviet retaliation.  However, possible Israeli involvement was just as likely to trigger 
Soviet retaliation as U.S.  The administration and Kissinger were successful in assuring 
that Hussein and Jordan would remain, but were not involved in the negotiation of the 
Cairo cease-fire agreement which allowed for the struggle to continue in Jordan until 
1971. 
The Munich massacre also caused a national security crisis over the balance of 
power since the President and Kissinger struggled to lessen the likelihood of Israeli 
retaliation while they once again relied on the State Department to work indirectly to 
negotiate the release of the hostages.  The concern over the public display of the lowering 
the flags and the President’s attendance at the funerals for the athletes provides an 
interesting debate over the delicate balance between the U.S., Israelis, and the radical 
Arab governments.  The Nixon administration understood the attack as a travesty against 
Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games (a global peaceful display of athletic talent) and 
could have taken a strong or even militant stance on the side of Israel to punish the BSO, 
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or the states harboring the BSO, but this would have been a threat to U.S. national 
security that could have threatened all the reasons for Kissinger’s pursuit of détente in the 
Middle East. 
 The slaying of two U.S. diplomats in Khartoum is the clearest example of a 
national security crisis over the balance in the region.  If the U.S. made a decision which 
could have threatened alliances with Saudi Arabia or damage an already delicate 
relationship with the Sudanese government under President Nimeiry the balance could 
have tipped in the favor of the Soviets.  The Nixon and Ford administrations knew that 
the attack against a Saudi Arabian embassy in Sudan, a country just across the Red Sea, 
could potentially cause a conflict between Sudan and Saudi Arabia.  This conflict could 
have harmed the U.S. relationship with Sudan which was just being restored since it was 
severed in 1967. Also, Khartoum represented a threat to the delicate alliance between the 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia and the possible threat of Soviet influence over the Saudi 
government to insure greater access to oil.274  Following the break of diplomatic ties with 
Sudan after Nimeiry commuted the sentences of the BSO terrorists, a national security 
concern developed because Nimeiry supported Sinai II, the agreement being promoted by 
Kissinger between Israel and Egypt.  If the U.S. did not restore relations with Sudan, they 
could have alienated Nimeiry who was one of a very small number of Arab leaders who 
supported the agreement.  Ultimately the U.S., under President Ford, chose to restore 
diplomatic relations to maintain the support of an Arab leader for the Sinai II agreement 
and the opportunity to supply an Arab state with materials to combat transnational 
Palestinian terrorism. 
The administration’s and Kissinger’s inability to understand the transnational 
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nature of Palestinian terrorism is unique and new to the historiography of U.S. 
involvement in the post-1967 Arab-Israeli conflict because the historiography has been 
dominated by international histories.  These international histories argue that the U.S. 
policy in the region since 1967 had followed a policy of preventing Soviet dominance in 
the region through the pursuit of détente and the Rogers Plan.  Also, that the U.S. tried 
not to alienate the Arab states with these efforts in the hopes that they would not go to the 
Soviets for support.  Historians also recognize the fact that the U.S. understood that the 
Soviets wanted: “land, oil, power, and the warm waters of the Mediterranean” and that 
these desires threatened U.S. national security in the region.275  These histories outline the 
relationships between nations (i.e., U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Israeli, Soviet-Arab, etc).   More 
specifically the historiography argues that the U.S. tried to walk a delicate diplomatic line 
which would allow for “mutually binding peace contracts” between Israel and the Arab 
states, but not between Israel, the Arab States, and the transnational Palestinian 
organizations.276  Understanding that the historiography focuses strictly on national 
relationships and not the relationships between states and non-state actors makes the 
transnational argument made in this thesis more important in the development of a more 
nuanced picture of U.S. involvement in the post-1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. 
This more nuanced picture recognizes the importance of the transnational nature 
of the Palestinian organizations and their relationships with the nations their terrorism 
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targeted.  Understanding the transnational nature allows for analysis of not just the 
diplomatic events and agreements, but how and why their nationalist agenda challenged 
the era of détente.  A transnational history allows for a narrative that moves beyond the 
state to look at how the state is interconnected to forces outside and how those forces 
impact each other.  This thesis demonstrates how interconnected relationships between 
the administration, the Palestinian organizations, and other actors in the international 
system shaped the inability of Kissinger’s realism to address the transnational nature of 
the Palestinian terrorism because Kissinger struggled to use interstate diplomacy to end 
the crises while he worked towards détente in the region.  
 Since the beginning of the Nixon administration terrorism was seen as a national 
security crisis that triggered debates about the safety of civil aviation, the need for 
increased screening at airports and security aboard the aircraft, debates among states of 
how to prevent terrorism, and the safety of domestic and foreign diplomats in the U.S. or 
abroad.  Each of these national security concerns were discussed at various points, but 
were not pursued further after the crises ended because international terrorism, most 
importantly transnational Palestinian terrorism was only a secondary concern of President 
Nixon and Kissinger who were faced with other foreign policy dilemmas that needed 
immediate attention.  If Kissinger’s realism would have been capable of understanding 
the simple fact that the organizations were stateless, he would not have been able to work 
with them directly because he drew from his knowledge of nineteenth century Europe 
that only interstate diplomacy was the means to secure peace.  
§ 
In an address to the American Bar Association Annual Convention, Montreal 
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Canada, 11 August 1975 Kissinger summed up the impacts of international terrorism on 
states and the international community, and how both have struggled to address this new 
problem: 
 Terrorism, like piracy, must be seen as outside the law.  It discredits any 
political objective that it purports to serve and any nations which encourage it.  If 
all nations deny terrorists a safe haven, terrorist practices will be substantially 
reduced—just as the incidence of skyjacking has declined sharply as a result of 
multilateral and bilateral agreements.  All governments have a duty to defend 
civilized life by supporting such measures. 
 
 The struggle to restrain violence by law meets on of its severest tests in the 
law of war.  Historically, nations have found it possible to observe certain rules in 
their conduct of war.  This restraint has been extended and codified, especially in 
the past century.  In our time new, ever more awesome tools of warfare, the 
bitterness of ideologies and civil warfare, and weakened bonds of social cohesion 
have brought an even more brutal dimension to human conflict.277 
 
The irony of Kissinger’s address before the bar is that he had the opportunity to combat 
international terrorism, but failed to do so because his realist worldview drew the wrong 
lessons from history that interstate diplomacy and strong leaders was the means to 
secure peace during the Cold War.  If Kissinger could have dealt with Palestinian 
statelessness he could have developed measures to combat future international terrorist 





                                                






Détente, the easing of U.S.-Soviet foreign relations during the Cold War; often through 
negotiations and linkages to policy issues 
Fedayeen, Palestinian guerilla fighters  
Guerilla warfare is irregular warfare pursued by a number of irregular combatants that 
use mobile military tactics; often use ambushes, sabotage, harassment, etc. 
Linkage, the policy pursued by the U.S. during the 1970s, and championed by President 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger; connection of  political and military issues, thereby 
establishing a relationship making progress in area “A” dependent on progress in area 
“B” 
Realism, the prioritization of national interests and national security; political and 
diplomatic rather than idealism or morality 
Realpolitik, politics and diplomacy rather than ideology; based on balance of power and 
interstate diplomacy 
Terrorism, a political strategy pursued in the modern era for the gain of political 
concessions; understood to be irrational violence, rather than the rational violence of war  
Transnational, a global interconnectedness between states and non-state actors in the 
international system which interact with each other extraterritorially; the 
internationalization of terrorism and guerilla warfare by stateless militant organizations 
targeted against domestic and foreign targets; the adoption of Third World liberation 
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